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"Fortress Europe" in the Telecommunications Sector as a
Consequence of "Europe 1992": Reality or Imagination?
Marc Andr6 A1*
As more and more services are transacted both nationally and internationally
through data flows, telecommunications becomes not simply one sector among
many, but something much more important-the central nervous system of the
international economy.'
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article was born out of frustration. Many Americans have accused the European
Community (EC) of protectiofiism and of discriminating against U.S. companies. These
accusations became more prevalent as the end of 1992 drew near, the year which preceded
the establishment of the Internal Market in the European Community. The EC's alleged
protectionism and discrimination even received a name: "Fortress Europe." An article about
Fortress Europe, however, was not possible because it would involve too many aspects of
international trade. Instead, this Article focuses on the protectionism and discrimination
which the EC allegedly practices in the telecommunications sector, an area of significant
economic interest, but it excludes questions of the mass media and communication via
satellite. Many facts and conclusions in this Article are of a general nature and apply to trade
and relations between the EC and any country. However, this Article is limited to products,
producers, and service providers from the United States, because the accusations of
protectionism and discrimination, and the idea for this Article, originated there.
1992 will be remembered in history as the year that ended with the Internal Market
opening among EC Member States. The goal of securing the free movement of goods,
servicesi capital, and people motivated the creation of the Internal Market.2 With the
opening of the Internal Market, the EC member states will eliminate remaining non-tariff
barriers and will harmonize market regulations on an EC-wide basis. This will permit
companies to compete freely in an open market.
2. These are the four fundamental freedoms. See R.H. LAuwAARS & C.W.A. TPm&ammns, EURoPEES
GEMEENscHAsREcHT IN KORT BESTEK 140 (1989). See also PJ.G. KAFrEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT,
INMTODUCrION TO THE LAw OF TE EuRoPEAN CoMMuNms 355 (1990).
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The EC member states seek to create an economic entity which, in many respects, will
be comparable to the U.S. With the Internal Market in place, the EC's market should begin
to assume a place of equal importance to that of the U.S.3 The realization of the aims of the
Single European Ace is what is now referred to as "Europe 1992," or, as the French more
correctly say, "Europe 1993."' This Article refers to the realization of the Single European
Act's aims as the 1992 Program.
The changes resulting from the completion of the Internal Market generally can be
welcomed from an economic point of view because absolute6 and comparative7 cost
advantages can be better exploited. However, some countries outside the EC have raised
questions about the 1992 Program and fear that it will have protectionist effects. This fear
increased when the European Commission declared that European Economic Community
(EEC) firms, not outsiders, should be the main beneficiaries of the frontier-free EEC.8 The
term Fortress Europe is the paradox which encompasses the closing of the EC's market for
non-member states as the market opens for member states.
Focusing the inquiry at hand, this Article examines the extent to which the accusation
and fear of Fortress Europe is realistic in the telecommunications sector as a result of the
1992 Program. Because the EC's commercial policy exists within a framework of
international obligations and the EC's own treaty system, this Article must first address two
issues. The first issue is whether access to the EC telecommunication equipment and
services markets can and will be restricted for non-member telecommunication equipment
and services, such as from the U.S., as a result of the 1992 Program. The second issue is
whether within the Community there can and will be discrimination against non-member
telecommunication equipment and service providers as a result of the 1992 Program.
The inquiry into the validity of the Fortress Europe accusation consists of an analysis
of the EC's international obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and under EC telecommunications legislation. This analysis makes possible a
3. Robert M. Jarvis, American Business and the Single European Act: Scaling the Walls of "Fortress
Europe," 20 CALWmr. INT'L L.J. 227, 229 (1990).
4. Single European Act, Feb. 17-28, 1986, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1, 25 I.L.M. 5 (1986), reprinted in 49
C.M.L.R. 741 (1987); Hans-Jachim Glaesner, The Single European Act: Attempt at an Appraisal, 10 FORDHAM
INT'L L.. 471 (1987).
5. According to the TREATY ESTABLiSHINO THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cnd 5179 I) (official English version), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48 (1958) (unofficial
English translation) (as amended by the Single European Act, OJ. (L 169) 1 (1987) [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
The Internal Market is only to be established as of December 31, 1992. Therefore, "1992" does not really start
until 1993. The declaration on article 8A of the EEC Treaty clearly states that "setting the date of 31 December
1992 does not create an automatic legal effect," although Schermers argues that this does not deprive the date
of all legal effect, and that the obligation to complete the Internal Market before January 1, 1993 is sufficiently
well defined for disregard of it to be the subject of a finding of a failure to act pursuant to article 175 of the
EEC Treaty. Henry 0. Schermers, The Effect of the Date 31 December 1992,28 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 275,
289 (1991).
6. See generally ADAM SMITH, INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(1776).
7. See generally DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLS OF POLrTCAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1817).
8. The Back Door Is Still Open, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 1988, at 42 (U.S. Edition p. 50).
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determination of whether the international obligations of the EC and its legislation permit
its alleged discriminatory behavior. When one state accuses another state of protectionism,
the degree of trade liberalization within the accusing state inevitably shapes its perception
of what constitutes protectionism. Therefore, because the U.S. is the accuser, this Article
provides an overview of the U.S. telecommunications sector to determine the degree of trade
liberalization within it. A comparison between the telecommunications sectors of the two
trade blocks then follows. This Article concludes with an assessment of the validity of the
Fortress Europe accusation: the U.S. fear of protectionism is a misconception without factual
or legal basis.
I. THE CURRENT IMPORTANCE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Telecommunications are already, and will be increasingly, of vital importance to
economic, social, and cultural development worldwide.9 Telecommunications also play a
role in the international balance of trade. Although the EC continues to have an overall
positive trade balance worldwide in telecommunication equipment, its external trade surplus
fell in 1985 for the third consecutive year to ECU 1247 million from ECU 1533 million in
1984. More important, however, is that the trade deficits with the U.S. and Japan, two major
trading partners of the EC, widened by 25 percent and 61 percent respectively. 0 In 1988,
the trade deficit with the U.S. was approximately $418 million." The trade position in the
telecommunications-related services market is more difficult to estimate, although it is clear
that the high revenue international value-added services market is dominated by U.S.
providers. 2 Basic international telecommunication services, on the other hand, are jointly
provided by Community and external telecommunications operators, with revenues shared
according to negotiated accounting rates.
The telecommunications market actually consists of two very different markets. First,
there is a market in telecommunication equipment and technology, which includes switching
and transmission equipment, as well as terminal equipment. Second, there is a market for
9. In economic terms, their importance can be seen in the following figures. The conglomerate sector
of the management and transportation of information represented in 1987 already more than ECU 500 billion
worldwide. Commission of the European Communities, Towards a Dynamic European Community-Green Paper
on the development of the common market for telecommunications services and equipment: Communication
from the Commission, COM (87) 290 final, pt. 1 at 2 (1987) [hereinafter Green Paper]. The world market for
telecommunication equipment had reached ECU 90 billion in 1986, of which 17.5 billion was accounted for by
the EC. Id At the same time, EC revenue from telecommunication services amounted to 62.5 billion in 1985.
Id According to the Green Paper, the telecommunications sector might account for seven percent of Community
GDP by the end of the century, compared to only two percent in 1984. Id. Public and private investments in the
Community's telecommunications sector will total ECU 500 to 1000 billion before the year 2000. Id, pt. I at
2 and pt. 3 at 18. However, the overall effect on the economy will be even larger, due to the multiplier effect,
equal to 1.5, it should fall between ECU 750 and 1500 billion. Id, pt. 3 at 48. By the year 2000, more than 60
percent of EC employment will be strongly information related and will therefore increasingly depend on
telecommunications. HERBERT UNGERER, TELECOMMUNICATIONs IN EUROPE: FREE CHOICE FOR THE USER IN
EURoPE'S 1992 MARKET. THE CHALLENGE FOR Tm EURoPEAN COMmuNrTY 89 (1989).
10. Green Paper, supra note 9, pt. 3 at 158.
11. OFFcE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1991 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIATE REPORT ON
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 77 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 U.S. Report].
12. Green Paper, supra note 9, pt. 3 at 158.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 6
consumer telecommunication services. With some prominent exceptions, 3 the European
market for value-added services is still in its infancy. 4 As a result of changes in society,
demand for value-added services will steadily grow. With increasing technical and legal
opportunities to provide these services, the European market will become increasingly
important for both EC and non-EC service providers.
IlI. ANALYSIS OF THE TERM "FORTRESS EUROPE"
A. Towards a Definition of the Term
The Fortress Europe campaign was born in Washington, D.C. during the debate over
the Omnibus Trade Bill early in 1988.5 Outcries from lobbyists of financial service
providers were initially echoed by government spokespersons,16 as the apparent need to
find culprits for the trade deficit and for tough talk for political consumption in the U.S.
Congress fed the campaign. The outcries have not diminished since. Although literature,
magazines, and newspapers make extensive use of the term, no definition of Fortress Europe
appears to exist anywhere. This probably follows from the fact that the term describes a
feeling of fear that the EC's market would be closed off to non-EC products, producers, and
service providers with the establishment of the Internal Market at the end of 1992.
Although formal definition of Fortress Europe eludes formulation, it is possible to
distinguish two key elements. The first element centers on a fear of decreasing access to the
EC market for companies and products t7 originating outside the EC. This clearly is an
external element of the internal EC measures undertaken to establish the Internal Market.
The second element is a fear of discrimination in intra-Community trade of these non-
Community companies and products. This alleged discrimination will lead to favoring
Community companies and products over non-Community companies and products.
B. EC and Non-EC Companies
To lay the groundwork for an analysis of the EC's international obligations under GATT
and its telecommunications legislation, as these obligations pertain to the allegedly
decreasing access to the EC for non-EC telecommunications products and companies and
to disfavoring these products and companies in the EC, it is necessary to first establish what
is considered a non-EC company. Two types of non-EC companies exist. The first type is
geographically determined, and the second type has a political nature."8
13. See, e.g., French Teletel and Reuters financial services.
14. Green Paper, supra note 9, pt. 3, at 158-59.
15. Jacques Pelkmans, Europe-1992: A Handmaiden to GAT, in EUROPE 1992: WORLD PARTNER? THE
INTERNAL MARKEr AND THE WORLD POLMCAL ECONOMY 149 (Finn Laursen ed. 1991).
16. In 1988, U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter, for example, complained in a letter to Willy Do
Clercq, then Member cf the Commission responsible for foreign trade, about hints of protectionism in Do
Clercq's speeches about the 1992 Program. Blanca Riemer et al., Laying the Foundation for a Great Wall of
Europe, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 1, 1988, at 40.
17. The term "products" includes both equipment and services.
18. The special name and description of these two types of companies will be followed throughout this
Article, superseding the nonspecialized meanings of the two names.
1993 / "Fortress Europe" in Telecommunications?
The General Programmes for the abolition of restrictions on freedom of
establishment 9 and for the abolition of the restrictions on freedom to provide services"
mention "favoured companies." These are companies which have their registered office,
central administration, or principal place of business within the Community.2 Any
company that does not meet these geographical requirements is a "non-Community
company." This Article will call this type of company the "real" non-Community company,
in order to distinguish it from the second type of non-Community company, which it will call
the "political" non-Community company. The latter term will refer to real Community
companies established according to the law of one of the member states of the EC, which
may nevertheless be viewed as non-Community companies by the public and by the
company itself. An example of such a company would be the Dutch branch of AT&T
Network Systems International. Even though this company is settled in Hilversum, The
Netherlands, and is established according to Dutch law, it is often perceived as an American
company.
Existing discussions on the question of disfavoring non-Community companies within
the EC concentrate on this second, political, type of company. The political aspect of such
companies should lie in a genuine link with a non-EC country. B.A. Bozek relates that "in
the Nottebohm case,22 the [International] Court [of Justice] defined the effective and real
nationality of an individual as the juridical expression of the social fact of the individual's
connection with his country by his behavior, his activities, his family ties, his tradition, his
interests, sentiments and establishment."" Bozek then ponders the question whether or not
these criteria could be relevant for the nationality of ships, but concludes they could not.24
Similar comparisons between natural persons and inanimate objects have been rejected'
Although a like discussion may extend to the nationality of companies, it will not be
necessary, since, as will be shown, the U.S. fear of protectionism is a misconception without
factual or legal basis.
C. The Source of the Fear of Fortress Europe
Authors greatly disagree on the degree to which protectionism and discrimination will
increase with the realization of the Internal Market. Unfortunately, much of their work lacks
legal arguments and covers a host of aspects of trade in few pages. For example, although
19. Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ.) ENGLISH SPEC. ED., 2d Series, January 1974,
Heading IX, Resolutions of the Council and of the Member States, at 7.
20. Ua. at 3.
21. See EEC TREATY, supra note 5, art. 58.
22. Nottebohm (Lichtenstein v. Guatemala), [1955] I.CJ. 4 (Judgment of April 6, 1955).
23. Id. at 4.
24. "All these are criteria characteristic of human beings, but irrelevant for an inanimate object", B.A.
BoczEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCF. AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY (1962), quoted in H.W. Wefers Bettink,
Open Registry, the Genuine Link and the 1986 Convention on Registration Conditions for Ships, in
NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, vol. XVIH, at 84 n.44.
25. M.S. McDOUGAL AND W.T. BuRKE, THE PuBLIc ORDER OF THE OcEANs 1032 (1962), quoted in
Bettink, supra note 24, at 84 n.44.
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one author concludes that "the factual cumulative outcome of '1992' is liberal and will
greatly improve access [to the Community],"2 6 another writes that "the coming of the
internal market heralds the closing of Europe to outside parties and the beginning of an era
of new and unprecedented protectionism on the part of the members of the EC."'7 A fear
exists that import quo Las, reciprocity requirements, local content standards, minimum direct
investment standards, market segment insulation policies, and domestic company definitions
will result in preferential treatment for EC fimns.
The European Commission and Member State officials have denied that the 1992
Program is intended to operate against anyone. The Commission expects world trade to
increase as a result of the realization of the Internal Market, thus benefitting both EC and
non-EC countries.e Nonetheless, U.S. trade officials have referred to the Internal Market
as "the Infernal Market,"29 and a commentator has written that "the prospect of economic
integration [in Europe] threatens to produce new trade barriers that will shut out U.S.
goods."
30
IV. THE EC's ][NTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND ITS TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LEGISLkTION VERSUS THE PERCEPTION OF FORTRESS EUROPE
A. Fundamental Telecommunications Concepts
The exchange of information is an economically vital activity, even to the extent that it
affects the contemporary balance of power. As modem society's central nervous system,
telecommunications is a particularly critical area. The convergence of telecommunications,
computing, and the application of electronics in general has made possible the introduction
of a wide variety of new services.
Before describing the legal framework applicable to it, it is necessary to define
telecommunications. "Telecommunications embraces any transmission, emission or
reception of signs, signals, writing, images, and sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire,
radio, optical, and other electromagnetic systems."31 The telecommunications industry can
be divided into four sub-fields: network equipment, which is transmission and switching
equipment; terminal equipment, which is customer access equipment; basic services,
principally voice communications; and enhanced or value-added services, which is
manipulation of information, such as data processing conducted through telephone lines.32
26. Pelkmans, supra note 15, at 150.
27. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 230.
28. Scott Sullivan, Who's Afraid of 1992, NEwswEEK, Oct. 31, 1988, at 15 (U.S. Edition at p. 32).
29. Id.
30. Paul Magnusson, Carla Hills, Trade Warrior, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 22, 1990, at 34.
31. World Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conference, art. 2 (WAITC) regulation of Dec. 9,
1988.
32. Jarvis, supra note 3, at 254 n.129 (citing M. CA!NoAERT, TnE 1992 CHALLENME FROM EURoPE:
DavELoPMENT oF THE EURoPAN CoMMuNrry's INTEtNAL MARKEr 37 (1988)).
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In order to understand the current legislative framework of telecommunications in
Europe, it is necessary to describe its historical background. The situation in the individual
EC Member States has been largely similar to that in the Netherlands.3 Therefore, by way
of example, the Dutch national legal framework applicable to telecommunications will be
described. However, the discussion of Dutch law will focus on the years preceding 1989,
when the Dutch Staatsbedriff der Post, Telegrafle en Telefonie34 (PTT) gained inde-
pendence as a result of the European Commission's 1987 Green Paper on tele-
communications.
B. Old European Telecommunications Monopolies
1. Preliminaries
Since the late 1960s, the telephone has developed from a service restricted mainly to
business and emergency use, to a feature present in two out of every three households in the
EC. The task of placing the telephone within the reach of every consumer and business user,
independent of status, geographic location, and frequency of use, has made the public service
mandate the overriding business objective of telecommunications administrations in
Europe.35 This emphasis on public service, mainly interpreted as general telephone
coverage, has led to an extended monopoly regime for the provision of the network,
telephone, and telex services, as well as telephone sets, with the aim of ensuring the
financing of general network and telephone penetration.36 In most European countries, this
aim is further achieved by heavily subsidizing rentals and connections through usage-related
call charges. In all European countries, long-distance rates have served to subsidize local
rates.
37
2. The Dutch Model
Telecommunications legislation in the Netherlands established its roots at the turn of the
century. The same is true of legislation in other European countries. Diagram 1 shows the
connections in Dutch telecommunications regulation.
33. Except in the U.K., where the telecommunications market started to be liberalized somewhat earlier.
34. The English translation of the name of this entity is State Enterprise of Post, Telegraph, and
Telephone Service.
35. UNoERER, supra note 9, at 30.
36. Substantial differences in general telephone service penetration persist both between European
countries and between the world leaders in telecommunication penetration. An overview of telephone penetration
in the EC and in the U.S. has been included in Appendix Ill.
37. UNwmtm, supra note 9, at 30.
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CONNErIONS IN DUTCH TELECOMMUNICATION REGULATION
KEY TO TABLE
Telegra-ph &
Telephone Act
State Telephone Code
Telegraph Decree
Telex Decree
Data Network Decree
Indication Act
PIT 1954
General Terms Dir. -
Gen. PTT
3.2b/
3 sex 3 =
AW =
SMV=
,B-
OW-
Articles from T en T-wet
Indication Order 1970
Standard Authorization
Conditions
Cable Decree
Radio and TV Act
T en T-wet =
RTR =
TGB =
TXB =
DN-1 =
AWW=
AV=
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CONNECTIONS IN DUTCH TELECOMMUNICATION REGULATION
TABLE
Dutch legislation reserved to the state the right to provide telecommunication services.
Later, the PTT replaced the state in this role. The PTT was to comply with the general
directives of the Telegraaf- en Telefoonwet 190438 (T- en T wet). TheAanwijzingswetP7T
195439 governed the P'T's performance of its tasks, and it mentioned the borders within
which the PTT could carry out its "statal activities." The T- en T wet did not prohibit third
parties from supplying teleconrunication services. The ossibility of concessions to third
parties was left open, and theAanwizingswet did not obligate the PTT to subject its services'
38. The English translation is the Telegraph and Telephone Law of 1904.
39. The English translation is the Indication Act Concerning the PIT of 1954.
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use to conditions. Nevertheless, an Algemene Maatregel van Bestuur40 (AMvB), which
roughly compares to the British Order in Council, regulated the primary structure of all
telecommunication services and granted the right to provide the services to the PTT.
The Algemene Voorwaarden,41 enacted by the Director-General of the PTT, regulated
the details of telecommunications services. They were often easily changeable provisions.
The Algemene Voorwaarden were then incorporated into all contracts between users and the
PIT. Restrictions relating to the use of the telecommunications media, the admissibility of
terminal equipment, and the use and maintenance of the terminal equipment, lie primarily
in the Algemene Vootwaarden. Thus, the introduction of new equipment and services was
subject to PTT, rather than State, restrictions. The PTT effectively controlled the
communications media as a means of transport: it controlled terminal equipment; the use of
communications media and terminal equipment; and the maintenance of communications
media.
Since in practice a concession has never been granted to a third party, the PTT enjoyed
a factual monopoly for the construction and use of the public telegraph and telephone
system. The conditions and indemnification for the use of services provided by the PTT
were regulated by A~vlvBs insofar as they were not regulated by formal law.42 Four such
AMvBs existed: (1) Rijkstelefoonreglement,43 (2) Telegraafbesluit," (3) Telexbesluit,45
and (4) Datanetbesuit.46 The AMvBs contained general regulations relating to the
telegraph, telephone, telex, and data network systems. Every AMvB provided that the
Director-General of the PTT could issue further regulations in theAlgemene Voorwaarden.
The PTT's Director-General has issued such regulations governing the specifications of the
services and user terms, and regulations concerning terminal equipment are now present in
the Algemene Voorwaarden.47 In specific cases, only type-approved terminal equipment
may be connected to the network. Similar combinations of legislation and contractual
regulation existed in the other EC Member States.
3. Telecommunications in the EC
The structure of the telecommunication equipment industry in the EC was deeply
marked by the period of close cooperation between the national telecommunications
40. An AMvB is considered to be law in a material sense of the word but not in a formal sense. Contrary
to a formal law, an AMvB is issued by Royal Decree by the executive, without having passed the Second and
First Chambers of Parliament. T. KooYMANs, CowPENDuM VAN ET STAATsREcHT, para. 15 at 18 (5th ed.
1987).
41. The English translation of these regulations is General Terms.
42. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
43. The English translation is State Telephone Code.
44. The English translation is Telegraph Decree.
45. The English translation is Telex Decree.
46. The English translation is Data Network Decree.
47. Examples of Algemene Voorwaarden are: (1) Voorwaarden telefoonaansluitingen (Terms for
telephone connections); (2) Voorwaarden verkrijg en gebruik telexaansluiringen (Terms for obtaining and use
of telex connections); (3) Aansluitvoorwaarden openbaar datanet (Connection terms for the public data
network); (4) Voorwaarden beschikbaarstelling telegraaf-en telefoonhuurlijnen (Terms for the availability of
telegraph and telephone leased lines); and (5) Algemene voorwaarden bedrifstelecommunicatie-installaties
(General terms for company telecommunications installations).
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administrations and a small number of national suppliers which specialized in the
particularities of national networktechnology. This cooperation developed during therapid
buildup of the network in most European countries, and it encouraged governments to further
reinforce the closing of national markets. It is therefore not surprising that the efforts of the
European Commission throughout the 1970s to open the telecommunications markets, in
particular the procurement and equipment markets, were unsuccessful up to the end of that
decade. Moreover, all Member States, except for the U.K., had and still have only one
operator and one physical network.48 Thus, European telecommunications entered the
1980s with a fragmented, nationally focused, monopolistic telecommunications structure in
which national markets were largely closed to competition from other Member States.
Against this background, it is no surprise that there was little intra-EC trade.
Telecommunication equipment exports were roughly 23 percent of output, but only 30
percent of this went to EC markets.49
Apart from selective procurement and certification policies, incompatible standards and
input specificity are also responsible for this peculiarly closed market structure."0 Input
specificity, which is usually experienced in terms of specific national standards on quality
specifications, makes it difficult to open up the national markets quickly, given the high
adjustment costs of moving from one type of system or standard to another. But even when
technical standards are converging, buyer passivity can still reinforce input specificity.5
The entire situation had to change when, at the beginning of the 1980s, the underlying
structure encountered major difficulties. The technological base of communications changed
fundamentally. Within a few years, at an accelerating rate since 1980, the
telecommunications sector was propelled into the high technology field, subject to the
characteristics of the computer market: rapid innovation, substantially shorter depreciation
times, economies of scale and scope, and aggressive international competition. Exports and
imports of telecommunication equipment are now distributed fairly unevenly, with Germany
being the greatest exporter to non-EC countries, followed by France and the U.K. The U.K.
is the largest importer, followed by Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. Equipment
imports, in 1987, accounted for much less than 10 percent of final demand, a further
confirmation of the national orientation of these markets. In addition to a small amount of
intra-EC trade, more than 50 percent of telecommunication equipment imports came from
the U.S. and Japan.52
48. There are several operators in Denmark, France, Italy, and Portugal, but their responsibilities are
strictly delineated according to geographic and functional lines. J. Mfiller, The Benefits of Completing the
Internal Market for Telecommunication Services in the Community, in RESEARCH ON THE "COST OF NON-
EuROPe-BAsic FINDINoS, VOL. 10, at 9 n.5 (1988) [hereinafter Mfiller's Services].
49. J. MOller, The Benefits of Completing the Internal Market for Telecommunication Equipment in the
Community, in RESEARCH ON THE "COST oF NON-EUROPE"-BAsIc FINDINGS, VOL 10, at 14 (1988) [hereinafter
Muller's Equipment].
50. Buyer or input specificity means that the supplier delivers a good or a service which is specifically
customized to the user's need, for example, allowing compatibility with previous investments in a complex
network system.
51. MOller's Equipment, supra note 49 at 14-15.
52. Ida t 14.
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With the introduction of the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), data and
image transmissions are expected to increase significantly.53 Important applications can
also be expected with respect to Value-added Network Services (VANS).5 4 VANS will
most likely consist mainly of the following services: message storing, processing and
distribution; code and protocol conversion between different data processing systems;
information retrieval services; information processing services; and safety and alarm
services.55
C. The 1984 Action Programme, the 1987 Green Paper, and Other Programs
As is clear from -the preceding discussion, the EC's market in telecommunication
equipment and services was, until recently, characterized by a lack of intra-EC trade.
National monopolies prevailed and no new producers and service providers were allowed
to enter this market. Although the normal rules of the EEC Treaty apply fully to
telecommunications, the Commission considered it important to set out a special policy in
this field because of the importance of the telecommunications sector 56 and the special
position of the corporations involved.57 The Commission set out the policy in its 1984
Action Programme on Telecommunications" and in its 1987 Green Paper on
Telecommunications.59
1. The 1984 Action Programme
In the 1984 Action Programme, the Commission undertook its first in-depth analysis of
the economic, social, and technical importance of the sector. It stated that:
New technologies will fulfill a pump-priming role in the evolutionary process that
is taking place. Such technologies are at work not only in telecommunications
terminals, but also in the components sphere .... These technologies are, in
particular: digitization, which makes it possible to process much more sophisticated
data; the use of optical fibers which makes it possible to transmit information at
considerable higher rates and at much lower cost; the integration of micro-
electronics components and software; [and] the development of cable and satellite
links .... The resulting convergence of telecommunications, data-processing and
53. Miller's Services, supra note 48 at 2-3.
54. "Value-added service" is defined by Langley and Shain as "a communication service using
communications common carrier networks for transmission and providing added data services with separate
additional equipment. Added services may include store and forward message switching, terminal and host
interfacing." LONGLEY AND SHAIN, DIcIoNARY OF INFORMATION T1CHNOLOOY (2d ed. 1986).
55. Mfiller's Services supra note 48 at 4-5.
56. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text (discussing the emerging technical and legal
opportunities for telecommunication providers).
57. See supra notes 35-55 and accompanying text (discussing the extensive governmental regulations of
past telecommunication services).
58. Commission of the European Communities, Progress Report on the Thinking and Work done in the
field and initial Proposals for an Action Programme: Communication from the Commission to the Council on
Telecommunications, COM(84)277, 18.5.1984 [hereinafter Action Programme].
59. Green Paper, supra note 9, COM(87)290 final.
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audio-visual media will alter the nature of telecommunications and considerably
widen the range of services proposed.'
The report emphasized that "the economic and social impact will be considerable" 6' and
set out a six-point action program with the following objectives:
Placing at the disposal of users, as quickly as possible and at the lowest cost, the
equipment and services they require in order to ensure that they are sufficiently
competitive; stimulating European production of telecommunication equipment and
services in order to create a climate in which the Community industry can maintain
its strong position on the European market and stay in first place among world
exporters; allowing carriers to take up the technological and industrial challenges
with which they will be faced. 2
The Council of Ministers conf irmed the proposals at its meeting of December 17,1984,
and agreed on a four-part program of work.6 3 The first part is the creation of a Community
market for telecommunication equipment and terminals via a standardization policy aimed
at the effective implementation in the Community of common standards derived from
international standards, the progressive application of procedures for the mutual recognition
of type approval for terminals, and the opening up of access to public telecommunications
contracts, the first phase of which was initiated by the Council's Recommendation of
November 12, 1984.64 The second part is improving the development of advanced
telecommunications services and networks by opening discussions, based on available
studies, on the implementation of infrastructure projects of common interest and on the
launching of a development programme for the technology required in the long term for the
implementation of future wide-band networks, and by defining and progressively setting up
a video-communications system to link the various political authorities in the Community.
65
The third part is improved access for less-favored regions of the Community, through the
appropriate use of Community financial instruments, to the benefit of the development of
advanced services and networks." Finally, the fourth part is the coordination of negotiated
positions within the international organizations dealing with telecommunications, based on
discussions carried out jointly with the Working Party of Senior Officials on
Telecommunications.67
60. Id pt. 3 at 19-20.
61. Itt pt. 3, at 20.
62. Xa pt. 3, at 19-20.
63. Minutes of 979th Meeting of the Council, December 17, 1984, quoted in Green Paper, supra note
9, pt. 3 at 20-21 [hereinafter 979th Meeting Minutes].
64. Council's Recommendation of 12 November 1984, 84/550/EE0.
65. 979th Meeting Minutes, supra note 63.
66. Id
67. Id
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2. The 1987 Green Paper on Telecommunications
When the Commission issued the 1987 Green Paper, its aim was to launch a Europe-
wide debate on the future regulatory conditions of telecommunications, with a view to the
overriding objective of the 1992 market.6" The Green Paper therefore addressed itself
explicitly to the following: the Council; the European Parliament; the Economic and Social
Committee; telecommunications administrations; recognized private operating agencies;
European telecommunications, data-processing, and services industqies; users of
telecommunications services; and trade unions and other organizations which represent
social interests in this area.69 The objective was reached, given the fact that by January
1988 more than 45 organizations in the field, at the Community, national, and international
levels, had responded to the Green Paper.70
In the Green Paper, the Commission proposed more competition in a Europe-wide
market in order to develop the full potential of telecommunications in a quickly changing
environment. In order to achieve a single Community market by the end of 1992, Europe
needed this increase in competition. With the 1992 objective in mind, the Commission then
set out three clear objectives: (1) a common market in telecommunications terminal
equipment; (2) a common market in telecommunication services, in order to allow
telecommunications to develop into the all-pervasive infrastructure for the Community's
service and technology market of the 1992 Program; and (3) a common market in network
equipment, to ensure the Community's future position in large-scale information technology.
This market is closely linked with the Community's Research and Development (R&D)
policy71 and the opening of the procurement of the telecommunications administrations.
Since the presentation of the Green Paper, the Commission has been pressing the issue of
liberalization.
72
Some of the measures have taken effect already, such as the liberalization of
telecommunications terminal equipment. Others were due to take effect on or before January
1, 1993. It is clear that a vast change can be expected in the telecommunication equipment
and services sectors with the completion of the Internal Market.
68. Green Paper, supra note 9, pt. 3, at 19.
69. Ma pt. 2, at 2.
70. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT ON THE STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
GREEN PAPER ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON MARKEr FOR TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES AND
EQUIPMENT 11.
71. The R&D policy encompasses the R&D framework programme, Council Decision
87/516/Euratom/EEC of 28 September 1987 on the Framework Programme for Community Activities in the
Field of Research and Technological Development from 1987 to 1991, 24.10.1991 OJ. (L 302) 1, and the
Research and Development in Advanced Communications Technologies in Europe (RACE) Programme, Council
Decision 88/28/EEC of 14 December 1987 on a Community Programme in the field of telecommunications
technologies, Specifically, research and Development in Advanced Communication Technologies in Europe
(RACE), 21.1.1987 OJ. (L 16) 35.
72. An overview of the actions taken to date in response to the Green Paper are presented in Appendix
1.
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D. Trade in Telecommunication Equipment and Services
Can U.S. telecommunications manufacturers, equipment, and services be discriminated
against as a result of the 1992 Program? If so, a Fortress Europe would indeed exist. This
Article will now examine this question by addressing four issues.
1. Transatlantic Trade in Telecommunication Equipment
The first issue is whether the 1992 Program can lead to decreased access for U.S.
telecommunication equipment.73 Because most international trade in goods presently
occurs within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),74
discussion of this issue will begin with a short introduction to the Agreement, its main
principles, and the position of the Member States and the Community within the GATT.
Subsequently, the discussion will address six specific U.S. concerns about access to the EC
telecommunication equipment market.
a. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The GATT was the result of a round of negotiations, started in 1947 by 23 countries,
addressing the reduction of customs tariffs.75 The GATT is simultaneously a legal
framework for the conduct of trade relations between its member countries (Contracting
Parties), a forum for trade negotiations and the adaptation of its legal framework, and an
organ for conciliation and settlement of disputes. 76 The purpose of the GATT was the
reestablishment of world trade, whichhad declined significantly as a result of protectionism
and bilateralism following the 1930's and World War II.
The GAIT rules are based on the following principles: (1) Trade without discrimination,
which is furthered by the use of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause77 and by applying
73. This issue's resolution is closely linked to the resolution of another issue, intra-Community trade in
telecommunications equipment. See infra text accompanying notes 121-42 (discussing intra-Community trade
in telecommunications equipment).
74. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 A1365,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATJ.
75. These countries were the Commonwealth of Australia, the Kingdom of Belgium, the United States
of Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, the Republic of Chile, the Republic of China, the Republic of Cuba, the
Czechoslovak Republic, the French Republic, India, Lebanon, the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Kingdom of Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, the Union of
South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. Il
76. OLIvER LONG, LAW AND ITs LIMrrATIONS IN THE GAIT MULTiLATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 5 (1985).
77. GATT, supra note 74, art. I (requiring that trade advantages granted to one Contracting Party be
extended to all other Contracting Parties).
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the principle of national treatment;78 and (2) fair and transparent trade.79 The principles
of the General Agreement may be summarized in one sentence: "trade restrictions must as
much as possible be visible, goal oriented and price sensitive."8" In case of serious
unforeseen economic difficulties, Contracting Parties may invoke escape clauses which have
been incorporated in the Agreement. Finally, developing countries have a preferential status
in the GATT.
Amendments to the text of the General Agreement require a two-thirds majority of all
GATT members.8 Members which do not sign the new rules are not bound by them. 2
This results in old and new texts existing side-by-side, which is one of the major causes of
the system's complexity. Because it is often difficult to obtain a two-thirds majority, the
Contracting Parties increasingly seek recourse in the conclusion of separate agreements,
which may be incorporated in the GATT system. As stand-alone treaties, the codes bind
only those nations which sign and ratify them. Nevertheless, non-signatories may derive
rights from these codes, since trade advantages are multilateralized through the MFN clause.
This situation occurs when a code falls within the terms of the General Agreement and the
code provides for more favorable treatment than that provided for in the GATT.8 The
GATT Contracting Parties in November 1979 adopted a decision which takes this
position.84 During the forty-four years since the GATT came into effect on January 1,
1948,'- there has been a spectacular development in world trade. The number of member
countries has also greatly increased from 23, in 1948, to 102 at the present time.
86
Negotiations on the conditions of membership are under way with several countries.8
Under the GATT, a Contracting Party is defined as "those governments which are
applying the provisions of this Agreement under Articles XXVI or XXXIII or pursuant to
the Protocol of Provisional Application."88 All twelve EEC Member States were already
78. i art. II (requiring that products manufactured in one Contracting Party and imported into another
Contracting Party not be treated differently than products produced in the second Contracting Party).
79. Id arts. X and XI (providing that protection of markets may only be achieved through the use of
customs duties, so qualitative restrictions or quantitative restrictions, which are restrictions such as quotas which
can block the price mechanism and thereby block the functioning of the market economy in international trade
exchanges, are in principle prohibited). LONG, supra note 75, at 9.
80. G. Feketekuty, unpublished text of a lecture, cited in ARNOLD CoLLENrEUR, GENERAL AoREEMENT
ON TRADE IN SERVICES, SCHETS VAN EEN MOGELIUK JURIDISCH KADER VOOR GRENSOVERSCHRIJDENDE
DIENSTVERLENING, SKRIPTE IN HET KiDER VAN INTERNATIONAAL EKONOMISCH RECHT 16 (1988).
81. GAIT, supra note 74, art. XXX(1) (Amendments to articles I, II and XXX of GAIT require
unanimity, however).
82. id art. XXX(2).
83. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GAT, A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE GATT 28
(1990); WOLFGANG BENEDEK, DIE RECHTSORNUNG DES GAIT AUS v0ucmusHci-IciR SICHT 105-106 (1990).
84. Decision of 28 November 1979, 144905, GAIT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 26th
Supp. (1980), at 201 [hereinafter BISD].
85. Applied provisionally as from that date pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application, 55
U.N.T.S. 308.
86. El Salvador became the 102d Contracting Party on May 22, 1991. EUROPE No. 5500, May 29, 1991,
at 16.
87. Guatemala signed its Protocol of Accession to GAT on April 14, 1991 and will become a GAT
member 30 days after ratification by its legislative body. Algeria, Bulgaria, China, Honduras, and Paraguay are
in the process of negotiating membership. GAT, Acivrfms 1990, AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE
GAT 130-31 (1991).
88. GAT, supra note 74, art. XXXH(I).
1993 / "Fortress Europe" in Telecommunications?
GATT members when they concluded or subsequently acceded to the Treaties establishing
the European Communities. It is possible to argue that the EEC is a "separate customs
territory possessing full autonomy" over GATT matters. Because Article XXXIII of the
GATT allows a "separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its
external commercial relations and of other matters provided for in this Agreement" to
become a Contracting Party, the Community could itself become a Contracting Party. 9 It
may be further argued that the Community's participation in the GATT as a Contracting
Party sui generis for more than a quarter-century has already resulted in a tacitly agreed
membership sui generis.9" Since the GATT Dillon Round of 1960-61, the European
Commission has exercised almost all rights and obligations of the Member States in the
various GATT bodies, except in the Budget Committee. 9'
However, the Community has not taken steps to formally become a Contracting Party.
As long as the current voting rules do not change, this situation, oddly enough, results in a
stronger position for the Community than it would have if it were a Contracting Party. The
Community now effectively has twelve votes, rather than one, because each Member State
casts its vote as a Contracting Party.
The legal position of the Community and its Member States can be illustrated clearly
by looking at the question of liability.' Member States and the Community are jointly
liable for compliance with the GATT rules9 3 although this does not mean joint liability.
"[O]wing to their recognition of the Community's status, third states are obliged to address
the Community first."94 Recourse against the Member States remains only a subsidiary
possibility. This is applicable both where the violation of the GATT obligation has been
committed by the Community itself and where it is committed by a Member State.95
According to the GATT case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the GATT
forms an integral part of Community law, with a legal rank inferior to the EC Treaties but
superior to secondary Community law, that is, regulations, directives and decisions, and the
national laws of the Member States.9 6 Even so, the ECJ has considered "the spirit, the
89. JACKSON, supra note 83, at 20.
90. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Die EWG als GATT-Miuglied--Rechtskonflikte zwischen GA7T-Recht und
Europiischem Gemeinschaftsrecht, in GATT uND DIE EuRopAiscHE GEmNSCiHAir 130 (Meinhard J.FG. Hilf
& Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, eds. 1986).
91. This participation is based on article 113 of the EEC Treaty. Article 113 allocates competence over
Member States' external trade relations to the Community institutions.
92. This is an academic exercise because, according to Hilf, the question seldom arises in its full
acuteness in practice. Meinhard J.F.G. Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann: The European Community and GA7T
(Meinhard J.F.G. Hilf and Ernst-Ulich Petersmann, eds. 1986) at 160, in STUDMS IN TANSNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW, vol. 4.
93. Becker, in HANS GROEBEN, HANs BOECKH, Lr" AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG: DRrrrE
AUFLAaE, article 238, point 18; Christian Tomaschut, Liability for Mixed Agreements, in MIXED AGREEM
130 (David O'Keeffe & Henry G. Schermers, eds. 1983).
94. "As long as the Community and its Member States have not formally disclosed their internal
competence allocation, third states must ftrst take recourse against the Community. As a last resort the
Community is competent to decide on the delimitation of powers in regard to its Member States as was the case
with the conclusion of the mixed agreements in the Tokyo Round." Petersmann, supra note 90, at 160-61.
95. id at 160.
96. Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, World Trade Principles, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw,
volume 8, at 530-539 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1985).
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 6
general scheme and the terms of the General Agreement" and has concluded that the
Agreement "is chamc'terised by the great flexibility of its provisions" and "is not capable of
conferring on citizens of the Community rights which they can invoke before the courts.""
Thus, although the GATT provisions are binding for the EEC and the Member States,
individuals cannot invoke the GATT provisions in the national courts or before the European
Court of Justice. The provisions do not have direct effect.
b. U.S. Concerns
Although the U.S. government generally supports the creation of the Internal Market,
it has voiced concerns about its implementation and its consequences on U.S. products and
manufacturers. This Article will now analyze six specific U.S. concerns about access to the
EC telecommunication equipment market.
i. Introduction of Quantitative Restrictions
The first U.S. concern involves quantitative import restrictions which, it is feared, may
be placed on products on an EC-wide basis in order to protect national and regional
industries. With the advent of the Internal Market, border controls between Member States
will be removed, and all national quotas need to be abolished. This effectively leaves three
options to protect sensitive markets: lower EC quotas, higher tariffs, or Voluntary Export
Restraints (VERs).
L Pelkmans expacts lower quotas to be generally resisted by the liberal countries.98
There are no quantitative EC restrictions at the current time applicable to telecommunication
equipment, and EC strategy is oriented towards abolishing them in other areas. It is unlikely
that quantitative restrictions will be introduced any time soon. VERs are subject to the same
policy of abolishment as quantitative measures, although they may still be used for a
transitory period. 99
ii. Elimination of Import Duties
The U.S. has requested a total abolition of current import duties on telecommunication
equipment."° Although it is noble to strive towards lowering or abolishing import duties,
this is not a relevant matter in a discussion of Fortress Europe. The current import duties are
allowed by the GAT' and cannot be increased without violating article XXVIII bis of the
Agreement. Moreover, they are not a result of the 1992 Program. Protectionism to date
should not be confused with the 1992 Program.' The real problems for non-Community
manufacturers seem to be hidden in non-tariff barriers at the Member State level.
97. Joined cases 21-24172, International Fruit Company v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, [1972]
ECR 1219, considerations 21 and 27.
98. Pelkmans, supra note 15, at 132.
99. d, at 133.
100. 1991 U.S. Report, supra note 11, at 79.
101. Pelkmans, supra note 15, at 127.
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iii. The Standard Setting Process
The European standard-setting process is a third U.S. concern. The formal regional
European process for standard development allegedly is not open to persons or finns not
based in Europe, that is, real non-Community firms. For telecommunications, this is simply
not true. The EC does allow certain non-European experts, including experts from private
companies from third countries,"° to observe plenary and technical assembly meetings of
the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), because most
telecommunications standards are mandatory in the EC. In related fields, the EC has a good
reason for keeping the meetings closed: duplication of existing international standards
organizations, such as the International Standards Organization (ISO) and the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEO), is to be avoided. Moreover, member organizations
commit to adopting agreed regional standards without deviation when they join regional, but
not necessarily EC, organizations. The fact that the meetings are closed does not have very
drastic effects because first, to the extent appropriate, the EC adopts existing international
standards, and second, the EC standards are generally not mandatory, except in the case of
telecommunications, but rather represent only one way of demonstrating conformity to
essential requirements.
iv. Mandatory Testing and Certification in the EC
The U.S. fears that its manufacturers may be required to have tests conducted inthe EC.
This would be costly, especially since in many cases tests have been performed already for
U.S. market requirements. Products are normally approved by notified bodies in the
Member States. However, manufacturers may also maintain their own quality system, which
must then be approved and periodically inspected by one of the notified bodies. Because
non-Member States may also participate in this certification scheme, terminal equipment can
be manufactured, tested, and certified in the U.S., shipped to one of the Member States, and
then marketed and sold in any of the Member States.
The U.S. is also concerned that third country testing laboratories may not be able to
become notified bodies and that the EC might require reciprocal commercial guarantees for
mutual recognition'that go beyond what is necessary to ensure safety and to protect
customers. 10 3 Negotiations between the U.S. Trade Representative and the European
Commission will have to resolve this matter.
102. CLIFFORD CHANCE, THE CCH GUIDE TO 1993: CHANaEs IN EEC LAw 101 (2d ed. 1990).
103. U.S. GOVERNMENT TASK FORCE ON TIE EC INTERNAL MARKEr, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, EC 1992: AN ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC PoucY ISSUES RAISED By THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY'S SINGLE MARKET PROGRAM 13 (1990).
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v. Government Procurement
The public telecomnunications administrations in the Community have traditionally
been by far the largest buyers of telecommunication equipment, with a share of more than
70 percent of total purchases.' °4 However, only two percent of public contracts in the
Community are being awarded to companies from a different Member State than the one
where the contract is tendered."5 Extra-Community procurement occurs even less. This
de facto situation of local procurement is now slowly changing as a result of two Council
directives that have been in force for some years. The directives are intended to bring about
liberalization of national contract award procedures, in order to improve competition from
companies based in other Member States. The first directive concerns award procedures for
public works contracts,"0 6 and the other involves award procedures for public supply
contracts."°e Both directives, however, exclude the telecommunications sector from their
applicability.
Therefore, on September 17, 1990, the Council adopted a directive"8 on the
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport, and
telecommunications sectors. The directive obliges tendering bodies of all branches of
government to award contracts on the ground of either the criterion of the economically most
advantageous offer or the lowest price."° This directive is of particular interest to U.S.
suppliers. The U.S. government seeks access to these markets on a non-discriminatory basis
for its suppliers but fears that they will be excluded from the tenders. This fear is caused by
article 29 of the directive, which stipulates that any tender made may be rejected where the
proportion of the products originating in third countries exceeds 50 percent of the total value.
However, the Community has from the start declared that this and similar provisions were
negotiable. The directive will apply in full to products originating in countries in which
special reciprocity agreements have been concluded. Although the U.S. does not yet belong
to this group of countries, bilateral negotiations are now underway."0 Negotiations are
also underway in a multilateral context: the coverage of the GAIT Government Procurement
Code (GPC)"' is to be expanded to include the excluded sectors.
104. The total value of telecommunication equipment and services procurement in the Community
approximates ECU 200 billion annually, or around 8% to 9% of GDP. COM(86)375 final, 10.2.1987.
105. COMMISSl VAN DE EUROPESE GEMEENSCHAPPEN, EEN GEMEENSCHAPPELIJKE MARKT VOOR DIENSTEN
65 (1991).
106. Council Directive 71/305/EEC of 26.7.1971 concerning The Coordination of Procedures for the
Award of Public Works Contracts, 1971 OJ. (L 185) 5 16.8.1971; 1971 Q.J. English Special Edition (11) at 682,
last amended by Council Directive 90/531/EEC of 17.9.1990 on The Procurement Procedures of Entities
Operating in the Water, Energy, Transport and Telecommunications Sectors, 10 1990 O.J. (L 297) 129.
107. Council Directive 77/62/EEC of 21 December 1976, Coordinating Procedures for the Award of Public
Supply Contracts, 15.1.1977 OJ. (L 013) 1, last amended by Council Directive 90/531/EEC, supra note 106.
108. Council Directive 90/531/EEC, supra note 106, art. 27, para. 1.
109. Id
110. EUROPE No.5519, Jun. 24-25, 1991, at 11.
111. GATr, BISD, 26th Suppl. (1980) 33; expanded in 1987 and entered into force on February 14, 1988;
GATT, BISD, 34th Suppl. (1988) 12 [hereinafter GPC]. Because the subject of this code is explicitly excluded
from the General Agreement, Jackson and Benedek argue that it is one of the codes to which the GAIT MFN
clause does not apply. JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 28-29 (1990); BENEDEK, supra
note 83, at 106. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (discussing amendments to the text of the GATT).
The "excluded sectors" are given this name because they are excluded from the application of the "normal"
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The GPC applies to large purchases worth the equivalent of at least 150,000 Special
Drawing Rights by certain entities under the direct and substantial control of the Parties, that
is, governments." 2 Also, it provides for national treatment and non-discrimination.1 13
The code aims to reduce and ultimately to eliminate non-tariff barriers in the government
procurement sector, thereby increasing international trade. By publishing proposed
purchases and conditions for participation, the contracts and their award procedures are
brought under stricter international discipline.
The GPC requires that contracts be awarded to the lowest tender or the tender which is
determined to be the most advantageous. 4 Admittedly, this leaves a certain margin of
discretion to the awarding entity, but this margin is controlled by the Contracting Parties.
Unsuccessful tenderers and their governments have a right to information" 5 in order to
ensure that the purchase was made fairly and impartially. A consultation and dispute
settlement procedure has been set up, which is characterized by the installation of a
Committee on Government Procurement. The ultimate remedy which the Committee can
authorize is a suspension of the application of the Code.1 6 Although the Code has an
escape clause regarding security interests, public morals and order, and health, 17 this has
very little bearing on the U.S.-EC relationship in the telecommunications sector.
The difference between the bilateral and the multilateral negotiations is that while the
expansion of the GPC will cause the 50 percent content rule to disappear only at the level of
the national governments, full application of the directive, which is the goal of the bilateral
negotiations, will result in the abolition of the content rule at all levels of government.
Conclusion of either the bilateral or multilateral negotiations, orboth, will end discrimination
of U.S. tenders. As a result, the U.S. manufacturers' access to the public telecommunication
equipment market will increase enormously.
vi. Rules of Origin
The negotiations on public procurement will also automatically end the sixth U.S.
concern, EC rule of origin interpretations. This concern goes far beyond the
telecommunications sector. Virtually no multilateral rules exist for rules of origin, although
they are an issue in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations. 8 The U.S. is concerned that
real non-Community companies will have to invest in EC production facilities because the
public procurement directives 77/62, relative to the award of public supply contracts, and 71/305, relative to the
award of public works contracts.
112. GPC, supra note I 11, art. H.
113. Id, art. V:14(t).
114. It art. V:14.
115. Id. art. VI:4, 6.
116. ld. art. VII:14.
117. Id. art. VHI.
118. See generally, GEORGETOWN UNTvERsrrY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL BuswEss AND TRADE, THE
URUGUAY ROUND: THE NEw GAIT AGENDA: AGRICULTURE AND TRADE IN SERVICES (George M. Spiegelman
ed. 1988), Special Publication No. 24; Daniel K. Tarnllo, The U.S.-EC Trade Relationship and the Uruguay
Round, 24 COMMON MKT. L REv. 411 (1987).
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EC adheres to the rule of the last substantial transformation. However, rules of origin are
only important in sectors that are subject to quantitative restrictions, VERs, and monitoring
arrangements, or sectors where local content percentages apply. As discussed, there are no
EC quantitative restrictions or VERs presently applicable to telecommunication equipment,
nor are they expected any time soon. With a bilateral or multilateral public procurement
agreement, the current, non-mandatory content percentage will disappear. Finally, as this
Article will discuss below, 19 there are no monitoring arrangements in effect.
c. Assessment and Conclusion
Quantitative restrictions to access for U.S. telecommunication equipment to the
Community would clearly be in conflict with the Community's international obligations
undertheGATT. No quantitative restrictions currently exist, nor are they expected any time
soon. Import duties exist but do not block access to the market altogether, which would
violate the GATT. Import duties are not a violation of the GATT, are not caused by the 1992
Program, and should not be invoked in Fortress Europe discussions.
In direct contradiction to the accusations of discrimination and protectionism, the EC's
standardization and harmonization program, which is a direct result of the 1992 Program,
will actually simplify access to the market. Negotiations may establish possibilities for non-
Community testing laboratories to become notified bodies.
As soon as multilateral GATT Government Procurement Code or bilateral EC-U.S.
negotiations result in agreements, U.S. tenders cannot be discriminated against for public
procurement of telecommunication equipment. Multilateral negotiations will probably result
in expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Code to the excluded sectors, which
will lead to increased access to the telecommunication equipment markets of all Code
signatories. 12' A bilateral agreement would have the advantage of obliging not only central
governments, but also provinces and municipalities, to consider U.S. tenders. Abolition of
the 50 percent local content rule will in turn lead to the disappearance of the U.S. concern
regarding the EC rule of origin interpretation.
No proof has been found that the 1992 Program leads to restrictive access to the
Community for U.S. telecommunication equipment. Rather, it has been found that internal
EC measures which are a direct result of the 1992 Program will facilitate access for this
equipment. The 1992 Program can thus be said to improve access to the EC, even if some
matters may not benefit real non-Community companies as soon as real Community
companies, since some matters still have to be negotiated with non-Member States. Thus,
as far as access restrictions for U.S. telecommunication equipment are concerned, the
Fortress Europe accusation is not well founded.
119. See infra notes 121-42 and accompanying text (discussing intra-Community trade in
telecommuniciations equipment).
120. Currently, 23 countries are signatories.
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2. Intra-Community Trade in Telecommunication Equipment
Having examined the extra-Community factor of the Fortress Europe accusation, it now
becomes important to examine the intra-Community factor. The next issue addressed is
whether U.S. telecommunication equipment is being disfavored, or will be disfavored, in
intra-Community trade compared to equipment originating in the Member States as a
consequence of the 1992 Program. Two questions will be answered: first, does U.S.
equipment receive national treatment in each Member State, as required by article DI of the
GATT, and, second, will such equipment receive Community treatment?
12
'
a. National Treatment of U.S. Telecommunication Equipment
The elimination of customs duties between Member States 122 and the elimination of
quantitative restrictions between Member States'23 apply equally to products originating in
Member States and to products coming from third countries which are in "free circulation"
in Member States.124 Third country products become "entitled to 'free circulation' in
Member States," as soon as import formalities have been complied with and any customs
duties have been paid. 125 From that moment on, these third country products are
"definitely and wholly assimilated to products originating in Member States" 26 and, like
products originating in Member States, may not be discriminated against compared to
national products.'27 This means that non-Community equipment receives national
treatment once it has been imported into one of the Member States.
b. Formal Community Treatment of U.S. Telecommunications Equipment
The second and more important question to be answered here is whether receiving
national treatment means that the foreign product also receives Community treatment. This
question is more difficult because the answer depends in part on the question of whether a
Common Commercial Policy exists for the product concerned, which here is
telecommunications. Existence of a Common Commercial Policy in the sense of article 113
of the EEC Treaty entails that Member States can no longer maintain national commercial
policies in the concerned area and therefore can no longer invoke article 115 of the EEC
Treaty, which would allow them to take measures to protect these national commercial
policies.'28 However, for the Common Commercial Policy to take full effect, it must be
121. If a product or company receives "national" or "Community treatment," it is treated as if it were a
product or company originating in the country concerned or in the Community.
122. EEC TREATY, supra note 5, arts. 12-17.
123. Id arts. 30-37.
124. Il art. 9, par. 2.
125. Id. art. 10, par. 1.
126. Case 41/76, Donckerwolcke v. Procureur de la R6publique, [1976] ECR 1921, 1935, consideration
17.
127. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 7, par. 1. The fact that some products which are in free circulation may
not freely be traded between Member States is a different matter. The focus here is on products which have been
admitted in the Member State concerned.
128. Case 4176, Donckerwolckesupra note 126, considerations 19-27, at 1935-37, and case 242/84, Tezi
Textiel BV v. Minister of Economic Affairs, [1986] ECR 933, 943, consideration 39.
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"a real Common Commercial Policy," based on uniform principles regarding conditions of
importation, irrespective of the Member State concerned. 29
All telecommunication equipment is covered by Regulation 288/82/EEC on Common
Rules for Imports.13' This means that the normal rules for the free movement of goods
apply to telecommunication equipment originating in the U.S. and that this equipment is
treated as if it originates in the EC. That is, it receives Community treatment. Although the
situation appears settled, in reality it is not. As discussed above,"' the telecommunication
equipment market is known for its lack of intra-Community trade. This applies not only to
telecommunication equipment originating in the Member States, but also to equipment
originating in third countries, which is in free circulation in the Community. It is here that
a real problem can be found for non-Community products. The national EC manufacturers
may sell relatively little in other Member States, but they have their home market to rely on,
which is not true forU.S. manufacturers. The latter cannot make use of economies of scale
because standards are different in the diverse Member States and because they only have
small market shares in each individual Member State. Thus, even if it can be shown that no
formal disfavoring would exist in putative intra-EEC trade, the current market structure
results in a less favorable position for non-Community telecommunication equipment.
Therefore, in a material sense, this equipment does not receive Community treatment.
c. Material Non-Community Treatment: Limited Intra-Community Trade
The lack of intra-EEC trade is caused by four major factors: (1) preferences of the
national governments; (2) national prohibitions on the sale of terminal equipment; (3)
differences in standards; and (4) selective certification and testing policies.
Procurement preferences of national governments are now covered by Directive
90/531/EEC. 32 The forthcoming' 33 special review procedure, which extends the
applicability of Directive 89/665/EEC"3 to the excluded sectors, will guarantee a way of
recourse to companies which feel that a Member State continues to buy locally without valid
economic reasons. Therefore, this factor will soon lose its meaning.
The second cause of the small amount of intra-EEC telecommunication equipment trade
was the national prohibitions tosell this equipment privately. A large portion of the private
telecommunications market is accounted for by telecommunications terminal equipment.
The Commission defines "terminal equipment" as:
129. Case 4176, Donckerwnolckesupra note 126, consideration 25, at 1936, and case 242/84, Tezisupra
note 128, considerations 38 & 39, at 943.
130. 9.2.1982 OJ. (L 35) 1, as last amended by Regulation 2978/91, 7.10.1991 OJ. (L 284) 1.
131. See supra notes 35-55 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 104-32 and accompanying text.
133. Revised Commission proposal for a Council Directive coordinating the laws, regulations, and
administrative provisior relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, COM(91) 158 final - SYN 292,
submitted to the Council on June 4, 1991.
134. Council Directive of December 21, 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures'to the award of public supply and
public works contracts, 30.12.1989 OJ. (L 395) 33.
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[E]quipment directly or indirectly connected to the termination of a public
telecommunications network to send, process or receive information. A connection
is indirect if equipment is placed between the terminal and the termination of the
network. In either case (direct or indirect), the connection may be made by wire,
optical fibre or electromagnetically. Terminal equipment also means receive-only
satellite stations not reconnected to the public network of a Member State.'35
Member States frequently reserved special or exclusive rights for the sale of these products.
According to the Commission, these rights were often "exercised in such a way as, in
practice, to disadvantage equipment from other Member States, notably by preventing users
from freely choosing the equipment that best suits their needs in terms of price and quality.
.. 1 It is quite obvious that equipment from non-Community origin shared this
disadvantaged treatment in every respect. Finding that this practice violated article 37,
paragraphs 1 and 2, and articles 86 and 90(1) of the EEC Treaty, the Commission issued
Directive 88/30 1/EEC. 137 The legal basis of the directive was challenged in the
Telecommunications case. 138 However, the ECJ found for the Commission on the
exclusive importation and marketing of telecommunications equipment issues and on the
issue of exclusive rights to connect, bring into service, and maintain terminal equipment.
This brought about a withdrawal of these exclusive rights by the Member States. Therefore,
users now have a free choice between the various types of equipment available, including
terminal equipment imported from third countries, subject only to restrictions regarding
essential non-economic requirements."'
Different technical standards, testing and certification policies, and differences in
existing systems currently make research prohibitively expensive and access to the
equipment market difficult. The main thrust of the Community's standardization policy in
the information technology (IT) and telecommunications fields is to achieve a significant
increase in conformity with accepted standards for products and services marketed and used
within the Community. The policy thus involves formally adopting standards at a European
level, and, as far as possible, adopting existing international standards for that purpose.
Although some technical specifications concerning the essential requirements for products
may be mandatory, others are not. Manufacturers may choose between European Standards
(ENs)," which give immediate access to the entire EC market, or any alternative standard,
135. Commission Directive 8813011EEC of 16.5.1988 on Competition in the Markets in
Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, art. 1, 27-5.1988 OJ. (L 131) 73.
136. Id consideration 5.
137. Commission Directive 88/301/EEC, supra note 135, art. 1.
138. Case C-202/88, France v. Commission, Judgment of March 19, 1991,5 C.M.L.R. 552 (1992).
139. "Essential requirements" are the non-economic reasons in the general interest which may cause a
Member State to restrict access to the public telecommunications network or public telecommunication services.
These requirements are: Secure network operations, maintenance of network integrity and, in justified cases,
interoperability of services and data protection. Council Directive 90/387/EEC of June 28, 1990, art. 2, para. 6,
on The Establishment of the Internal Market for Telecommunication Services Through the Implementation of
Open Network Provision, 24.7.1990 OJ. (L 192) 1.
140. European standards for telecommunication equipment and services are approved by ETSI and called
European Telecommunications Standard (NET) [Norme Europene de Telecommunications]. Commission of the
EC, DG XIII, Telecommunications, Information Industries and Innovation, Standardization-Fact Sheet 5, at 2
(1990). NETs are given mandatory force, according to the legal procedure established in Council Directive
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which also confers access to that market after independent certification. National standards
which conflict with the European ones must be withdrawn. In order to ensure that the
standards are applied in practice, steps are being taken to ensure that national legislation
requires reference to IT standards in national technical regulations, in public procurement
requirements, and in standards applying to the connection of equipment to the public
telecommunications networks in the Member States.
Different testing and approval procedures existed in all Member States. A single testing
and approval procedure replaced those when Directive 911263/EEC' 41 took effect on
November 6, 1992. This means that tests carried out under harmonized standards and
certified in one Member State are valid throughout the Community. Such certified
equipment can then be placed on the market and connected to a public network in any of the
Member States without the requirement of repeated testing or further approval formalities
in the country of destination. This aspect of the Internal Market is often underestimated. It
will generate huge economies of scale by allowing manufacturers to produce uniform
products for sale across the EC, while costs of administrative nuisance and uncertainty will
decrease.
&. Assessment and Conclusion
In a material sense, non-Community telecommunication equipment does not receive
Community treatment due to the lack of intra-Community trade in this equipment. To the
extent that equipment from non-EEC origin is in the process of being placed in the same
position as equipment originating in one of the Member States, this approach formally favors
Community and non-Community products alike. However, it will materially and
significantly alter the position of non-Community equipment, enabling its manufacturers to
make full use of the Internal Market of 343 million consumers. Thus, rather than disfavoring
non-Community telecommunication equipment, the 1992 Program will improve the current
position of these products and place them in a position equal to that of equipment originating
in the Community. Thus, it allows non-Community manufacturers to compete on an equal
basis with their EC competitors. Some authorities have even suggested that U.S. competitors
will be at a considerable advantage. 142 They already have a vast manufacturing
infrastructure from their large domestic base, something that the EC is only beginning to
work towards.
Non-Community telecommunication equipment will receive national and Community
treatment in post- 1992 Europe and will therefore not be disfavored compared to
telecommunication equipment originating in one of the Member States. For U.S.
86/361/EEC of July 24, 1986 on the initial stage of the mutual recognition of type approval for
telecommunications terminal equipment. 17.7.1986 OJ. (L 217) 1.
141. Article 14 of Council Directive 91/263/EEC of April 29,1991 on the Approximation of the Laws of
the Member States Concerning Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, Including the Mutual Recognition of
Their Conformity, 23.5.1991 OJ. (L 128) 1.
142. See, e.g., Simon J. Keeble, True Unity at Last?, A Pius for U.S. Firms - If Reality Reflects Rules,
INDUSTRY WK., Sept. 21, 1987, at 21.
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telecommunication equipment, the 1992 Program cannot lead to more restricted access to the
Community, and U.S. telecommunication equipment cannot be disfavored in intra-
Community trade. Thus, there is no Fortress Europe regarding the sale of U.S.
telecommunication equipment.
3. Transatlantic Trade in Telecommunication Services
Enormous amounts of services are presently provided through telecommunications.
Although it is not possible to measure the volume of these voice and data flows exactly, it
will without question increase exponentially with the computerization and automation of
society. Naturally, telecommunication service providers are eager to profit from this trend.
For the purposes of this Article, the market for telecommunication services can be split into
two different geographical markets: a market for transatlantic telecommunication services
and the intra-Community market for these services. This discussion will address the former,
and therefore, the main issue is whether the Community's 1992 Program leads to decreased
access to the EC for U.S. telecommunication services and service providers.
a. Transatlantic Telecommunication Services
Transatlantic telecommunication services are provided jointly by neighboring carriers,
which forward transit traffic to its final destinations. The carriers are reimbursed for the
services they provide, and they reimburse other carriers for the services provided to them.
This has lead some countries to decrease their international rates, in order to attract extra
transit revenue. It is clear that it would be particularly profitable to deliver door-to-door, or
rather terminal-to-terminal service, which would eliminate having to pay other carriers.
However, as the discussion below shows, the telecommunication services sector is not at
present covered by the GATT rules, and therefore, no obligations to grant access exist.
Changing the way the system currently operates is a matter which requires negotiation.
b. Services in the GATP
Negotiations are presently continuing in the GATT Uruguay Round. One of the main
topics in those negotiations is services. Some commentators have tried to argue that trade
in services is already covered by the GATT. For example, they point to article IV of the
GATT, which contains special provisions relating to cinematographic films. Another
argument is that the Agreement often cites "products," which could include services.143
Moreover, article I of the GATT mentions specifically "distribution" and "transportation,"
which are both services. However, the opinion of the majority of authorities and Contracting
Parties is that the GATT's reference to distribution and transportation merely recognizes the
fact that these services make the trade in goods possible, and it rejects the idea that services
would be covered by the current Agreement. 1"
143. CoLLNTErmm, supra note 80, at 27.
144. 1l
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Because the focus in trade negotiations gradually shifted away from tariff barriers
towards non-tariff barriers, services were discussed increasingly during the seven negotiation
rounds preceding the Uruguay Round. The U.S., confronted with an enormous trade deficit,
pushed hard to include services in the current round of trade negotiations. The hope is that
exporting the vast supply of the U.S. services will help balance the trade deficit. Thus, when
the Uruguay Round started on September 20, 1986 with the Declaration of Punta del
Este,145 the ministers of the Contracting Parties, in a separate second part of the declaration
called Negotiations on Trade in Services,146 announced their intention to come to a
multilateral system of principles and rules for trade in services. The aim was to expand trade
by improving transparency and liberalization of services, but the negotiations have yet to
result in any concrete services agreements.
c. U.S. Concerns
The fact that the negotiations have not resulted in any concrete agreements does not
mean that there was no trade in telecommunication services between the U.S. and the EC;
all basic telephone calls are telephone services, and U.S. exports of value-added telephone
services to the EC were an estimated $170 million in 1989.' The U.S. is concerned,
however, that discrimination against U.S. suppliers could restrict those exports to the current
level while demand is rising. Specifically, there are three U.S. concerns relative to access
to the EC telecommunication services market. In the order which this Article will examine
them, they are: (1) diminishing rights of establishment; (2) standards; and (3) restriction of
U.S. telecommunications services.
i. Diminishing Rights of Establishment
The U.S. is concerned that U.S. companies will not receive national treatment within the
EC, and that they will be treated less favorably than EC firms. Although this is a matter
which will be discussed below,14 it now bears noting that U.S. government trade reports
link the U.S. fear of being disfavored with fears of diminishing rights of establishment,
without which national treatment has little practical significance. Rights of establishment
concern access to the EC market and as such are discussed here.
Apart from possible future GATT rights relating to access and establishment, there are
two sources for rights of establishment for U.S. companies. The first source is the Treaties
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. 49 The U.S. has bilaterally concluded these
145. 25 I.L.M. 1623 (1986).
146. Id at 1627.
147. 1991 U.S. Report, supra note 11, at 77.
148. See infra notes 171-210 and accompanying text (discussing intra-Community trade in
telelcommunication services).
149. The United States has concluded Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Belgium,
14 U.S.T.S. 1284 (1961); Denmark, 12 U.S.T.S. 908 (1951); France, 11 U.S.T.S. 2938 (1959) (Convention on
Establishment); Germany, 7 U.S.T.S. 1839 (1954); Greece, 5 U.S.T.S. 1829 (1951); Ireland, 1 U.S.T.S. 785
(1950); Italy, 12 U.S.T.S. 131 (1948, with supplemental agreement in 1951); Luxembourg, 14 U.S.T.S. 251
(1962); the Netherlands, 8 U.S.T.S. 2043 (1956), 285 U.N.T.S. 231,231-33; ("Verdrag van vriendschap, handel
en scheepvaart tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Verenigde Staten van Amerika," concluded at The
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treaties with at least nine EC Member States.15 Although some of these treaties are rather
old and therefore not quite as extensive and detailed as more recent ones, most include some
form of right of establishment clause and can be invoked before the International Court of
Justice, thus giving the U.S. a concrete opportunity to effectuate the rights contained in them.
The second source for rights of establishment is the Code of Liberalization of Capital
Movements (CLCM)' of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). 52 The CLCM includes a right of establishment for foreign investors from other
OECD member countries. 53 The Code commits OECD member countries to the goal of
progressive liberalization.'- Although the OECD does allow an EC Member State to grant
more favorable treatment to other EC Member States, 155 it does not permit them to
discriminate additionally against non-EC countries. Admittedly, the OECD Code is not very
strong. Although it is legally binding, it lacks enforcement or formal dispute settlement
mechanisms. Yet, the OECD has proven to be a successful forum for dispute
settlements.1
56
As shall be seen below, 157 third country undertakings, that is, political non-Community
companies, can benefit from the intra-EC right of establishment 58 and from the right to
provide cross-border services in the EC 59 once they are established within one Member
State, which makes them real Community companies. It is within the discretion of each
Member State to permit the first leap towards its territory. This opportunity has received
wide use, and, as far as the U.S. is concerned, it can be based on the strong rights in the
Treaties of Friendship, as well as the weaker rights in the OECD Code of Liberalization of
Capital Movements. It is therefore not clear why the U.S. is suddenly anxious that access
to the EC telecommunications market will be restricted.
ii. Standards
The effectiveness of opening up telecommunications in Europe, especially providing
access for value-added services, is almost entirely determined by compatibility standards.
Hague on March 27, 1956); Trb. 1956, 40; Trb. 1957, 234; and Trb. 1963, 54. Letter dated August 27, 1991,
from Mr. Steven R. Ratner, Attorney-Adviser for Economic, Business and Communications Affairs, United
States Department of State.
150. See supra note 149 (citing treaties with various countries).
151. Act OECD/C(61)96, adopted by the OECD Council on December 12, 1961, as last amended by act
OECD/C(73)12(Final), adopted on February 27, 1973 [hereinafter "CLCM"].
152. All EEC Member States, as well as the U.S., are OECD member countries. P. KooYMAHs,
INTERNATIONAAL PUBLKRc IN voGELvLucHT 143 (1989); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNAT!ONAL LAW 607
(2d ed. 1986).
153. CLCM, art. 2(a)j* Annex A. Annex A has last been amended by act OECD/C(70)126(Final), adopted
by the OECD Council on September 17, 1970.
154. Il art. 1.
155. This is the "Customs Union exception." Ia art. 10.
156. This has proven to be true, at least as far as the U.S.-EC relationship, for example, the in the
discussions relating to the EC's Second Banking Directive.
157. See infra notes 171-210 and accompanying text.
158. EEC TATY, supra note 5, art. 52 j* 58.
159. L art. 59 j* 58.
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This Article already addressed the standard-setting process."e This process is no different
for telecommunication services, that is, ONP standards, than it is for telecommunication
equipment, that is, NETs. Non-European experts are allowed to observe plenary and
technical meetings of ETSI. As previously discussed, U.S. concerns about being excluded
from the EC standard setting process are not justified.
Nevertheless, there remains a need to discuss international standards. Because of
different standards, different technologies, and different qualities of the national networks,
it does not always make sense to mutually recognize current standards and certification.
Europe-wide programs are designed to ensure compatible standards for the new Integrated
Systems Digital Network (ISDN), 6 ' the Digital European Cordless Telecommunications
program (DECT),6 2 and the Pan-European Digital Mobile Cellular Communications
System (GSM) 163 systems. The realization of these programs will exponentially increase
possibilities for value-added services. In order to maximize profit from these new systems,
it is imperative for non-European service providers to ensure that international standards be
set in the ISO and IE C. These standards will then most likely be used as standards for the
new systems.
iii. Restriction of U.S. Telecommunication Services
This Article previously noted," that the U.S. fears that telecommunication services
exports will be restricted to the current level, despite rising demand for these services. This
currently is a legitimate concern, although it has no relation to the 1992 Program. Although
the EC is currently facilitating the leasing of international telephone lines, 65 further
opening of access to the EC for transatlantic U.S. value-added services will have to be
negotiated bilaterally or multilaterally, preferably within the current GATT negotiating
round. In order to argue that the EC is protectionistic in this regard, it is crucial to realize
that protectionism which has occurred to date should not be confused with the 1992 Program,
and is misplaced in discussions on the reality of the Fortress Europe accusation.
Access to providing voice telephony service from the U.S. to the EC through EC
telecommunications administrations is not controlled by EC regulations. Providing direct
access to the consumer, however, generally requires the physical presence of the service
provider in the geographical area concerned, and it will therefore be discussed below.166
To be complete, it should be mentioned that the U.S. was closely following the EC proposals
160. See supra notes 73-103 and accompanying text (discussing intra-Community trade in
telecommunication equipment).
161. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing introduction of the ISDN).
162. See Appendix I.
163. See U
164. See supra notes 147-68 and accompanying text.
165. Pelkmans, supra note 15, at 143. See Council Directive 92/44/EED of 5.6.92 on the Application of
Open Network Provision to Leased Lines, 19.6.1992 OJ. (L 165).
166. See infra notes 171-210 and accompanying text (discussing intra-Community trade in
telecommunication services).
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on government procurement of telecommunications services. However, the U.S. indicated
already that it did not expect a 50 percent content rule in those proposals. That expectation
has come true. Council Directive 92/50/EEC of June 18, 1992, relating to the coordination
of procedures for the award of public service contracts, 16 7 does not mention a minimum
content requirement. 68
d. Assessment and Conclusion
Can the Community's 1992 Program lead to a decrease in access to the EC for U.S.
telecommunication services and service providers? Although no agreements have yet been
reached in the GATT negotiations, trade already exists in basic and value-added telephone
services. Only one U.S. concern, the standardization process, is a result of the 1992
Program. However, this process is not a discriminatory or access-reducing move on the part
of the EC, but rather an applaudable drive towards greater uniformity, which will increase
access to the EC's telecommunications market as a whole for telecommunication service
providers worldwide. The fact that the EC determines its own standards in the absence of
international ones is a sign of failing international willpower to come to international
standards and it should not prevent the EC from integrating the national markets of the
Member States. Meanwhile, the concern of decreasing rights of establishment seems to be
unwarranted.
As will be discussed below,' 69 access to providing voice telephony service will
predictably remain restricted, although the current GATT negotiating round will ideally lead
to further worldwide opening of enhanced or value-added telecommunication services
markets. This, however, depends on bilateral or multilateral trade concessions in the
negotiations, the outcome of which cannot be predicted. Still, it is a positive sign that both
the U.S. and the EC are in favor of opening the telecommunication services markets. The
European Commission rightfully considers "easy two-way access of European service
providers and users to the global market [to be] necessary." 17
Whatever the outcome of present negotiations, they have little to do with the Fortress
Europe accusation. Rather, they stem from practices that have existed since the beginning
of modem telecommunications in Europe. The 1992 Program cannot be said to have any
negative impact on access to the EC's telecommunication services market, and its
harmonization process will facilitate access to the value-added telecommunications market.
Therefore, the Fortress Europe accusation must be considered invalid in the context of
transatlantic trade in telecommunication services.
167. Council Directive 92150/EEC, 24.7.1992 OJ. (L 209).
168. This is also called a "discrimination clause" in the U.S.
169. See infra notes 171-210 and accompanying text (discussing intra-Community trade in
telecommunication services).
170. Green Paper, supra note 9, pt. 3 at 47.
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4. Intra-Community Trade in Telecommunication Services
This final analytical section focuses on "U.S. companies." These are companies which
are established and formed in an EC Member State, thus making them real Community
companies, but which at the same time have a political link to the U.S. A rumor persists in
the U.S. that political non-Community companies from the U.S. are disfavored in the EC.
The discussion above, which included the definition of political non-Community company,
promised to show that this fear is a misconception without legal or factual basis."' Doing
so is the first goal of this present discussion. The second issue that will be addressed is the
extent of possibilities for real Community companies to provide services in the European
telecommunication services market.
a. Community Treatment of U.S. Companies
Political non-Community companies satisfy the EEC Treaty requirement that they have
their registered office, central administration, or principal place of business within the
Community.172 The General Programmes additionally require that such companies show
a real and continuous link with the economy of one of the Member States if they have only
a registered office within the Community but intend to set up agencies, branches, or
subsidiaries in a second Member State.'73 The U.S. government sees the parentage of U.S.
companies as the link to the U.S. which may cause them to be disfavored, compared to
companies based in the EC. However, the General Programmes state explicitly that the
required link "shall not be of nationality, whether of the members of the company or firm,
or of the persons holding managerial or supervisory posts therein, or of the holders of the
capital."174 Neither the EEC Treaty or the General Programmes, or any other legislative
EC provision, is concerned with the political nature of companies. Political non-Community
companies fulfill the EEC Treaty's geographical requirements'75 and the geographical
requirements of the General Programmes, so they are Community companies. They can
make full use of the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment. Thus,
U.S. companies are Community companies and receive national treatment. They cannot be
disfavored because of a political link with a non-Member State, such as the U.S.
b. The Extent of Opportunities and Freedom to Provide Telecommunication
Services in the EC
As will be discussed below, 76 the European telecommunications sector is organized
quite differently than the U.S. telecommunications sector. However, both sectors share
171. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text (discussing EC and non-EC companies).
172. EEC TREATY, supra note 5, art. 58.
173. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing Title I of the General Programmes).
174. Title I of the General Programmes, supra note 19.
175. EEC TREATY, supra note 5, art. 58(1).
176. See infra notes 243-60 and accompanying text (comparing the EC and U.S. telecommunications
sectors).
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common characteristics, one ofwhichis that they started out with an essentially monopolistic
position in providing telecommunication services. 177 The European Commission's Green
Paper on telecommunications and the ensuing Council and Commission directives will
continue to lead to an increase in possibilities for private undertakings to provide
telecommunication services between and in Member States.
The EEC Treaty describes the freedom to provide services as follows: "Without
prejudice to the provisions of the Chapter relating to the right of establishment, the
pergon 178 providing a service 179 may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue his activity
in the State where the service is provided, under the same conditions as are imposed by that
State on its own nationals."30 Although articles 52 and 59 of the EEC Treaty are directly
effective,' and article 59 of the EEC Treaty has horizontal direct effect, meaning that the
article can be invoked not only against a Member State but also against private persons, 82
the articles relating to services do not contain absolute prohibitions of discrimination;
exceptions are allowed.'83
The exceptions permitting discrimination are those connected with the exercise of
official authority, even if the authority is only occasionally exercised, and those connected
with public policy, public security, or public health. Thus, a provider of a service may have
to comply with specific requirements relating to, for example, organization, competence,
professional ethics, supervision, and responsibility in order to provide the service. This is
so, provided that first, these rules apply to everyone established in the territory of the
Member State in which the service is provided, and second, to the extent to which such
requirements are necessary to ensure that the provider of the service does not escape the net
of these rules by establishment in another Member State.'84 It is clear that the Member
States do not enjoy a completely free hand in determining the scope of these exceptions.'85
Like all exceptions, they must be interpreted restrictively.8 6 The requirement of necessity
is an objective requirement.8 7 The European Court of Justice has made it clear that a
ground of public interest, also expressed as the "general good," can only be invoked "in so
177. The monopolists were AT&T in the U.S. and the national PTrs in Europe. See supra notes 35-47
and accompanying text (discussing the EC telecommunication sector and infra notes 211-242 and accompanying
text (discussing the U.S. telecommunication sector).
178. Companies are treated the same as natural persons. See, e.g., EEC TREATY, supra note 5, art. 58(1).
179. "Services shall be considered to be 'services' within the meaning of the Treaty where they are
normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of
movement for goods, capital and persons." Id art. 60(1).
180. EEC TREATY, supra note 5, art. 60(3).
181. So held by the European Court of Justice in Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgian State, 1974 E.C.R. 631,
651-52, and Case 3374, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Metaalnijverheid, 1974
E.C.R. 1299, 1311-12, Considerations 24 and 27, respectively.
182. Case 3674, Walrave and Koch, 1974 E.C.R. 1405.
183. EEC TREATY, supra note 5, arts. 55, 56 j 66.
184. Van Binsbergen, supra note 181, at 1309-10.
185. Reyners, supra note 181, at 654, Consideration 43; Case 41/74, Van Duyn, 1974 E.C.R. 1337, 1350-
51, Consideration 18.
186. This is a general principle of international law, implied, for example, in article 31(1), Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, U.N. Doec. A/Conf.39/27 at 289 (1969),
reprinted at 8 IL.M. 679 (1969), entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980.
187. Van Binsbergen,supra note 181, at 1310, Consideration 16; Case 16/78, Choquet, 1978 E.C.R. 2293,
2302-03, Consideration 8; Case 205/84, Comm'n. v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. 3755,3802-03, Consideration 27.
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far as that interest is not safeguarded by the provisions to which the provider of the service
is subject in the Member State of his establishment.' 88
c. Telecommunication Services
The European Commission is of the opinion that:
None of [the] telecommunication services are connected with the exercise of
official authority involving the right to use undue powers compared with the
ordinary law, privileges of public power or a power of coercion over the public.
The supply of telecommunication services cannot in itself threaten public policy
and cannot affect public health.189
The Commission has therefore determined that "member States shall withdraw all special
or exclusive rights for the supply oftelecommunication services other than voice telephony
and shall take the measures necessary to ensure that any operator is entitled to supply such
telecommunications services."1 9 The Council specified at the same time that "open
network provision conditions.., must guarantee equality of access and must be non-
discriminatory, in accordance with Community law." 19t Regarding packet or circuit
switched data services, Member States could, until December 31, 1992, prohibit economic
operators from offeting leased line capacity for simple resale to the public.192 This peribd
may be extended until January 1, 1996 for some Member States, in which the network for
the provision of the packetpr circuit switched data services is not yet sufficiently developed.
Finally, Member States can include conditions regarding public-service requirements which
constitute objective, non-discriminatory, and transparent trade regulations regarding the
conditions of permnence, availability, and quality of the service.'93
Although Member States must ensure that operators be able to obtain leased lines for
purposes other than the simple resale of capacity for voice telephony and packet or circuit
switched data services, Member States need not renounce their special or exclusive rights
for the provision and exploitation of public telecommunications networks. 94 Doing so
would deprive the special voice telephony and data services provisions of all effect. The
European Commission has invoked article 90(2) of the EEC Treaty to exclude voice
telephony and the resale of capacity for packet or circuit switched data services, for the time
being, from competition. The article allows derogation from the application of articles 59
188. Webb, Case 279/80, 1981 E.C.R. 3305; 3325, Consideration 17, by analogy to the Rewe (Cassis de
Dijon) Judgment, Case 120178,1979 E.C.R. 649. See generally PJ.G. KAPrEYN & P. VERLoREN vAN THEMAAT,
INTRODUCION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AFrER THE CoMIN INTO FORCE OF THE SINGLE
EUROPEAN ACT 443-52 (Laurence W. Gormley ed. 1990).
189. Consideration 7, Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28.6.1990 on Competition in the Markets for
Telecommunications Services, 24.7.1990 OJ. (L 192) 10.
190. d. art. 2, par. 1.
191. Council Directive 90/387/EEC, supra note 139, art. 3, par. 1, third point.
192. Council Directive 90/338/EEC, supra note 189, art. 3, par. 1.
193. Id. Consideration 10.
194. Consideration 3, Council Directive 92/44/EEC, supra note 165; Commission Directive 90/338/EEC,
supra note 189; Council Directive 92/44/EEC, supra note 165, art. 4(1).
1993 / "Fortress Europe" in Telecommunications?
and 86 of the EEC Treaty when their application would obstruct the performance, in law or
in fact, of the particular task assigned to the telecommunications administrations. That task
consists in the provision and exploitation of a universal network, that is, one having general
geographical coverage which is provided to any service provider or user upon request within
a reasonable period of time.'95 Investments of ECU 500 to 1000 billion in universal
networks are expected over the next decade.'96 Because the majority of these investments
will be made by the telecommunications administrations, it is necessary to secure their
financial stability. However, opening voice telephony to competition could threaten this
financial stability. Additionally, competitive service providers could make leased lines
available for resale with limited or no added value. They would be able to take advantage
of the market by operating only the most profitable routes. Although increasing
telecommunication equipment and services trade are prominent goals of the Green Paper on
telecommunications, its first aim is the development of a strong telecommunications
infrastructure and efficient telecommunication services. This justifies the position the EC
takes with regard to voice telephony. A final reason for shielding voice telephony from
competition is that whether provided from the present telephone network or forming part of
the ISDN service, it is currently also the most important means of notifying emergency
services responsible for public safety.'
The current exclusion of the voice telephony market from competition means only that
Member States are not presently required to open that market. However, they may do so at
any moment they wish, following the lead of the U.K. Meanwhile, the Commission can
monitor the use which the telecommunications administrations make of their position.19
8
Sir Leon Brittan announced on July 5,1991, that the Commission will investigate telephone
rates in the Community in a full and formal investigation, based on Directive
90/388/EEC' 9 and articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty. Furthermore, the European
Commission's Directorate B of Directorate-General IV is currently concentrating its
monitoring activities explicitly on telecommunications.
200
d. ONP Standards
The Council has determined in its directive of June 28, 1990,201 that ONP standards
as developed shall carry with them the presumption that service providers which comply
with those standards fulfill the relevant essential requirements. Thus, when they want to
provide cross-border services or establish agencies, branches, or subsidiaries, they will be
able to do so without having to fulfill additional national requirements. This will greatly
facilitate the provision of these telecommunication services.
195. Council Directive 92/44/EEC, supra note 165, Consideration 18.
196. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
197. Commission Directive 90/388/EEC, supra note 189, Consideration 18.
198. EEC TREATY, supra note 5, art. 90(3).
199. See supra note 189.
200. Mr. D. Pantz, Directorate A, DG IV of the European Commission. Mr. Pantz's remark was provided
by Ms. C. Csizmadia, who interviewed him in Brussels on August 14, 1991.
201. Commission Directive 90/388/EEC, supra note 189.
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e. Competition
The future liberalization of all telecommunication services in the EC brings with it the
risk of concentration of some of the national PTTs. While it will be difficult for new carriers
to obtain a meaningful marketshare, it will become almost impossible if too many
concentrations are allowed.0 2 Council Regulation 4064/89/EEC20 3 recently provided
the European Commission with a legal instrument to control concentrations with a
Community dimension. To fall within the scope of the regulation, a concentration must
satisfy certain quantitative criteria.2 4 This regulation may prevent the establishment of
one or several large telecommunications providers with monopolistic tendencies, thereby
improving chances for new carriers. U.S. investment opportunities in the EC
telecommunications sector may thus be safeguarded by the regulation. The Commission's
guidelines on the applications of EEC competition rules in the telecommunications
sector" 5 make clear that the full application of the competition rules forms a major part
of the Community's overall approach to telecommunications.
f. Interested Parties
There will certainly be interested parties if the legal possibility of providing and
exploiting networks arises. Some possible service providers can already be named. For
example, both the Dutch and the English railway companies have expressed their
interest, 0 6 and several electricity companies have negotiated cooperation contracts with
the Dutch PTT Telecom.0 7 The electricity companies and the railways already have
networks at their disposal which could easily be made available to third parties. Large
international competitors of the Community's telecommunications administrations will also
be interested. In September 1989, for instance, AT&T bought Istel Ltd., one of Britain's
leading electronic messaging companies. Moreover, a representative of AT&T's Market
Regulation Affairs Department has remarked that "of course AT&T would want to take over
PTT Telecom, if it would be for sale." 2 8 However, AT&T's interest in operating next to
and in direct competition with PTT Telecom is not clear,2° which comes as no surprise,
given the amount oftelecommunication equipment AT&T sells to PTT Telecom each year.
202. Some concentrations have taken place already. A selected list of mergers and joint ventures which
took place between 1984 and 1987 has been included in Appendix II.
203. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 30.12.1989 OJ.(L
395) 1, rectijfied 21.9.1990 OJ (L 257) 13.
204. These criteria are a minimum combined worldwide turnover of ECU 5 billion and ECU 250 million
in individual Community turnover. Regulation 4064/89, art. I (2(a) and (b)).
205. Guidelines on the application of EEC competition rules in the telecommunications sector, 6.9.1991
OJ. (C 233) 2.
206. NS wilkabelnetopenstellen voor telefoonverkeer, DE VOLKSKRANT, Apr. 11, 1991, at 1, 3; Lilley to
End Duopoly between ,T and Mercury, THE TIMEs, Mar. 6, 1991, at 25.
207. DE VOLKSIatAWr, supra note 206, at 3.
208. Interview with Mr. Rudolf J. de Ruiter, on July 22, 1991, at AT&T's Dutch headquarters in
Hilversum.
209. Id The reason given was the need to safeguard AT&T's strategy.
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g. Assessment and Conclusion
Companies which are formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and
established there are treated as natural persons who are nationals of Member States.
Generally, only the geographical aspect (the "real" aspect) of companies is important, not
the political aspect: U.S. companies established in the EC are Community companies and
cannot be disfavored compared to EC companies.
The development of a strong telecommunications market and efficient
telecommunication services currently precludes voice telephony and packet and circuit
switched data services from being liberalized. However, smaller sectors, such as value-
added services, are now exposed to competition, and the Commission monitors the
telecommunications sector closely. The Commission has made it clear that the lack of
competition is a temporary revenue protection measure necessary for the development of the
telecommunication services sector. Once sufficiently developed, however, these services are
to be exposed to competition: data services from December 31, 1992, or January 1, 1996,
depending on the Member State, and voice telephony at a later date. Community-wide ONP
standards will assure provision of cross-border telecommunication services and easier
establishment in second Member States. Meanwhile, the Commission's authority over large
mergers and acquisitions will guarantee competition and prevent the establishment of
monopolies.
As will be discussed below,210 development and liberalization take time. Nonetheless,
the Commission will likely continue to force Member States and telecommunications
organizations to grant access to the national telecommunication services markets, in order
to truly develop a Community telecommunication services market. The 1992 Program and
the ensuing Green Paper on telecommunications have effectively led to limited but
continuous liberalization of the telecommunication services sector, for EC and U.S.
companies alike. Although voice telephony and data services are currently not as exposed
to competition as value-added services, this is not a protectionist change resulting from the
1992 Program but merely a condition being temporarily maintained in order to permit
development of the voice and data telecommunication services networks. In time, more and
more telecommunication services will be liberalized, thereby opening the European
Community telecommunication services market. Thus, the Fortress Europe accusation by
U.S. firms does not have validity in intra-Community trade in telecommunication services.
V. THE UNITED STATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
The degree of liberalization of a nation's own market influences its citizens' perception
of other countries' markets. This Article describes the U.S. telecommunications sector to
determine its degree of liberalization. A short historical overview of the sector's
development is necessary in order to fully understand current regulation of
telecommunication equipment and services in the U.S. The U.S. telecommunications sector
has a background which is very different from the nationally-oriented EC
telecommunications sector described above.2 u
210. See infra notes 211-42 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. telecommunication sector).
211. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text (discussing the EC telecommunication sector).
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The first and most important difference between the U.S. and the EC is that the U.S. is
among the few countries in the world with a privately owned telecommunications system.
Although some other countries are now privatizing the sector, most countries originally
started out with a public system. The second important difference in the U.S. is that long-
distance service providers are oriented to multiple states, each with their own legislation and
supervisory bodies.
A. The Rise and Fall of A T&Tas a Monopolist: Competition in Telecommunication
Services
AT&T's early power derived from its patents on the basic technology of transmitting
voice signals over copper wires. When the patents expired in the 1890's, other companies
started to provide local telephone services, but they were unable to provide interexchange,
or long-distance, service. AT&T had pioneered the development of long-distance
technology and used its patents to control that sector of telecommunications. Independent
local companies found it difficult to compete or to resist AT&T's offers to acquire them. At
the time, all telephone sets, private branch exchanges (PBXs), 2 2 and other standard
equipment used by residences or businesses were owned and leased by the telephone
companies. They, in turn, were obliged to buy from AT&T's Western Electric
manufacturing subsidiary. Thus, by the late 1930's, AT&T controlled almost the entire long-
distance market, 80 percent of the local exchange market, and a very large share of the
market for switching and terminal equipment. Furthermore, AT&T's Bell Laboratories were
supported by revenues from the Bell operating companies' license agreements.13
AT&T's position as the largest private company in the world was first threatened in
1949, when the Justice Department filed a Section 2 Sherman Act antitrust suit against
AT&T. This suit focused on AT&T's alleged monopolization of telephone equipment
through its exclusive purchases from Western Electric.21 4 The case was settled in 1956 by
a consent decree which permitted AT&T to keep Western Electric, but prohibited it from
entering any markets other than regulated telecommunications." 5 In 1959, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) decided to allow large private users to build their own
microwave systems." 6 To obtain a license, a user had to demonstrate the absence of
common-carrier alternatives. According to Crandall, this was the beginning of the end of
AT&T's monopoly over long-distance services21 Companies started to ask for the right
212. PBXs are customer owned switches, very similar to a telephone company's switch. They may be
connected directly to a long-distance carrier or to other PBXs, thereby bypassing a local carrier's circuits. The
modern, digital form of these switches are often referred to as Private Automatic Branch Exchanges (PABX).
ROBERT W. CRANIALL., AFrBR THE BREAKuP: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A MORE CoMPamvIr ERA 7
n.9 (1991).
213. ld at 17-18.
214. United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc. and American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Civil
Action 17-49, 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.NJ., Jan. 24, 1949) (fimal judgment by consent).
215. CRANDALL, mspra note 212, at 19.
216. Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands above 890MC, 27 FCC 359 (1959), known as the "Above
890 Decision." CRANDA..L, supra note 212, at 19-20.
217. CRANDALu, stpra note 212, at 19.
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to build microwave networks to sell services to smaller firms that could not afford to build
their own systems.
In 1969, Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) was authorized to build a common-
carrier network for private-line services.21 This authority was extended in 1971 to
specialized common carriers who were expected to concentrate primarily on offering data
services to smaller companies. However, when MCI found that it was possible to do so, it
started to promote an Execunet service that allowed private-line customers to obtain switched
long-distance service. Although the FCC apparently thought that its authorizations were
limited to private-line service, it never explicitly barred MCI from switched services.219
Therefore, the FCC lost every court ruling when it subsequently tried to block the Execunet
service. After that, new specialized carriers gained de facto acceptance. However, the new
long-distance companies, especially MCI, had difficulty trying to compete with AT&T as
they were simultaneously customers of AT&T for local circuits.
This difficulty finally led the Justice Department to file another antitrust suit in 1974.
The complaint charged that AT&T had abused its power as a bottleneck monopolist in
procuring equipment, excluding competition from the terminal equipment market, and
denying access to long-distance competitors.22 Eventually, the Justice Department and
AT&T settled the case out of court. The settlement required AT&T to divest itself of all
operating companies, but AT&T could retain Western Electric 22' and its Long Lines
divisions. Bell Laboratories also remained with AT&T, although part of its personnel was
transferred to a new research organization for the divested Bell Operating Companies
(BOCs), to be called Bellcore. Finally, AT&T was permitted to enter other fields of
electronics, including computers. The newly independent BOCs could only provide local
services, and were prohibited from engaging in competitive telecommunications activities,
such as manufacturing equipment or providing information services. This was to prevent the
reassembly of a new vertical monopoly. However, the BOCs were allowed to keep their
Yellow Pages and to sell Customer Premises Equipment (CPE). Congress has recently
relaxed the restrictions on the BOCs, allowing them to provide gateway circuits for videotex
systems and voice storage services. 222 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, reviewed, approved and finally entered the settlement agreement as a
modification of the 1956 decree.2' Therefore, it is often referred to as the Modified Final
Judgment, or simply the MFJ.224 The Bell telephone system thus ceased to exist on
January 1, 1984.
218. In re Microwave Communications, 18 FCC 2d 953 (1969).
219. CRANDALL, supra note 212, at 20 n.12.
220. Ad at 36 n.46.
221. Western Electric was renamed AT&T Technologies. Id at 76 n.2.
222. MFJ Modification Order, United States v. Western Electric, 714 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1988).
223. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
224. Modification of Final Judgment, United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 552 F. Supp.
131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'da sub. nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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B. Competition in Telieommunication Equipment
As late as the 1960s, attaching foreign equipment2 to a telephone line in the U.S.
violated the contracts which customers had with their local operating companies. Until the
1940s, the FCC did not oppose this practice at all. The FCC's decision22 6 to allow the use
of recording devices, subject to a protective connection arrangement, was the first exception
to these tariffs.227 More exceptions followed, and despite AT&T's protests, a certification
policy was established in 1975 for all equipment, including that supplied by
telecommunications companies. 228 However, AT&T delayed the program's
implementation, by challenging it in the appellate courts. With the appellate court's decision
in 1977,229 AT&T finally lost the ability to use state regulation to restrict the
interconnection of non-Western Electric equipment. Equipment can now be used on the
regulated networks, as long as it can be shown to be unharmful to the network and can be
connected through standard plugs or jacks.230
C. Current Regulation
FCC action has made possible the unlimited resale and shared use of domestic
services. 1 Until 1976, domestic resale and shared use were permitted, on a limited basis,
by the underlying caniers. In 1976, the FCC found tariffprohibitions on domestic resale and
shared use of private line services unjust, unreasonable, and unlawful. Four years later, the
Commission extended its policy of requiring resale and shared use to message
telecommunications services (MTS) and wide-area telephone services (WATS).
Since 1984,232 little progress toward deregulation has been made. Only terminal
equipment is now fully deregulated. Since the 1983 AT&T antitrust decree, all common
carrier services remain under federal and state regulation, as well as under judicial
regulation. Although the formal jurisdiction of the regulatory bodies is well delineated
geographically, the intangible nature of telephone service and the common costs of services
crossing these boundaries cause many problems.
At the interstate level, AT&T remains a regulated, dominant carrier whose tariffs'must
be approved by the FCC. Other competitive carriers are not subject to rate regulation,
225. "Foreign equipment" here means equipment not supplied by the local operating company.
226. In re Use of Recording Devices, 11 FCC 1033 (1947).
227. CRAANDAL, supra note 212, at 88.
228. In re Proposals for New or Revised Classes, 56 FCC 2d 593 (1975).
229. North Carolina. Utilities Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
230. CRANDALL, supra note 212, at 89.
231. A reseller is an entity which subscribes to communications services and facilities of another
communications entity and then re-offers it to the public on a profit-making basis. Shared use is defmed as a
non-profit arrangement in which several users collectively use communications services obtained from an
underlying carrier or resale carrier, and each sharer pays on a pro rata portion of the costs. U.S. GovEmENT,
U.S. NATIONAL STUDY ON TRADE IN SERvIcES: A SUBMISSION BY THE UNITED STATES GOvERNMENT TO THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON1 TARIFs AND TRADE 17 (1984).
232. The old Bell telephone system ceased to exist on January 1, 1984. See supra notes 212-224 and
accompanying text.
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although they have to report their revenues to the FCC. For enhanced or value-added
services, FCC rules require that AT&T and the regional BOCs provide open network
architecture or comparably efficient interconnection to ensure that competitive service
vendors have access to bottleneck facility services.z3 At the state level, most intrastate toll
and local exchange service remains tightly regulated. Some states have liberalized entry into
these markets, but only Nebraska has totally deregulated intrastate telecommunications.2
D. Subsidization
Although the FCC did not regulate individual AT&T rates for most of the period
between 1934 and 1960, AT&T implicitly had to maintain switched long-distance rates that
were geographically uniform, regardless of the traffic density on the route. The average rates
had to be just and reasonable, but individual rates did not have to reflect costs. Over time,
at least five types of rate distortions developed in this regulated sector: (1) long-distance
rates were held artificially high to mitigate increases in local rates; (2) long-distance rates
were based on distance, not on call density; (3) local rates were usually lower for high-cost
rural areas than for lower-cost urban areas; (4) business users were charged more for access
and local exchange service than residential users in the same exchange; and (5) local service
was generally offered on a flat-rate basis, so heavy users paid no more for local service than
users who placed less of a burden on traffic sensitive facilities 5
Until World War II, the cost of local loops was borne fully by local exchange
companies. This pricing principle was challenged in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone,236
in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Illinois Bell could not assign all of the local loop
costs to local service" 7 Responding in part to this Court decisiofi, a joint board of federal
and state regulators decided in 1943 to allocate local plant costs between local and interstate
jurisdictions in proportion to the minutes of use in each category. The formula used in
allocating the local loop costs, the subscriber plant factor (S.PF), was changed three times;
in 1950, in 1965, and in 1969.238 Each change raised the interstate share of local costs.2 39
By 1981, the interstate share of usage had risen to eight percent, but regulators were
allocated twenty-seven percent of non-traffic-sensitive costs to interstate calls.'u Because
it was inefficient to allow non-traffic-sensitive costs to be recovered from long-distance calls,
the FCC proposed to phase out this cost recovery system and replace it with fixed monthly
subscriber-line charges (SLCs). Due to strong political opposition, this plan has not been
233. Third Computer Inquiry, 104 FCC 2d 958 (1986). The Computer III Decision was overturned by.the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in June 1990, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990), and the FCC is
reconsidering its decision. CRANDALL, supra note 212, at 159 n.18.
234. CRANDALL, supra note 212, at 41.
235. 1&. at 24-29.
236. 282 U.S. 133 (1930).
237. Id at 151
238. See CRANDAL, supra note 212, at 25.
239. Md.
240. Id at 23-25.
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fully implemented, but SLCs are currently $3.50 per month. Moreover, the FCC has frozen
the SPF and will reduce it to twenty-five percent within eight years."4
E. Current Telecommunications Consumer Options
The U.S. telephone industry has undergone a major organizational and regulatory
transformation in the past decade. Consumers may now purchase equipment from scores of
different companies, and long-distance service may be acquired from AT&T or from several
competitive carriers.24 2 Although local service in most states is still governed by
monopolies, much of what was once local service may now be obtained through PBXs, local
area networks on the customer's premises, and even large private, unregulated fiberoptic
networks. In fact, users may build their own customized private networks and choose where,
if at all, to connect to the regulated network. The cost of fiber optics will probably lead to
a renewed market concentration in long-distance services,' 3 but cellular systems may, on
the other hand, become a meaningful alternative for local access. In the long run, this will
most likely lead to a relaxation of the line-of-business restrictions placed on the BOCs.
2
"
VI. COMPARISON OF THE EC AND U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SECTORS AND CONCLUDING ASSESSMENT
This discussion consists of two distinct parts. The first part compares the EC and U.S.
telecommunications sectors. The two telecommunications sectors have some characteristics
which are totally different. However, they also share some striking similarities which must
be considered in discussions of Fortress Europe. The second part is the final assessment of
this Article, concluding that the accusation and fear of Fortress Europe are unfounded.
A. Comparison of the EC and U.S. Telecommunications Sectors
1. Public versu, Private
As discussed above, 5 the first and foremost difference between the EC and the U.S.
telecommunications sectors is that the U.S. is among the few countries in the world with a
privately owned telecommunications system. Although the U.K. has partially privatized
British Telecom,2 it started out with a public telecommunications administration, as did
the other EC Member States. The fact that the U.S. system was privately owned has spurred
241. When voice telephony will be liberalized in the EC, regulators can thus look forward to similar
problems as the FCC has faced in the U.S.: deciding on models and means of measuring costs and distributing
them evenly over local and long-distance service providers. See supra notes 62-72, 171 and accompanying text.
242. See CRANDALL, supra note 212, at 10-11.
243. ALd at 4.
244. See ar at 162.
245. See supra notes 35-47,211-42 and accompanying text (discussing the EC and U.S. telecommunication
sectors).
246. The U.K. government now holds 49 percent of its shares.
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competition somewhat earlier than in the EC. However, intervention on the federal level was
necessary in the U.S. to make the competition possible. This is quite like the action the
European Commission is currently taking at the Community level in the EC.
2. Telecommunication Equipment
The manufacture of telecommunication equipment has not been explicitly regulated in
the EC nor in the U.S. The monopoly position of sole distributor of telecommunication
equipment, for the national PTTs in Europe and the local operating companies in the U.S.,
was made possible by prohibiting interconnection of foreign terminal equipment?" to the
telephone network. In the EC, transmission and switching equipment was bought from a
small number of national suppliers which specialized in each national market's network
technology, while AT&T bought most network equipment from its own manufacturing
subsidiary, Western Electric.
In the late 1970s, AT&T had to allow non-Western Electric equipment to be
interconnected due to the FCC's 1975 certification program,248 and to court rulings.249
The European Commission's Directive 88/301/EEC25 had the same effect in the EC in the
late 1980s.
3. Telecommunication Services
Several differences can be found in the organization of the EC and U.S.
telecommunication services sectors. One company provides local and long-distance services
within the state in most Member States of the EC. Although Denmark, France, Italy, and
Portugal have several operators, their services are delineated according to geographical and
functional lines. All are publicly owned. The only exception is the U.K., where a duopoly
exists between British Telecom, which is 49 percent publicly owned, and Mercury, which
is privately owned. Other firms will soon be able to run new telecommunications networks,
according to the U.K. trade secretary."
The national telecommunications administrations or the foreign telecommunication
service provider jointly provide long-distance service between Member States and to non-
Community countries. Although voice telephony services are still excluded from
competition in the EC, Member States have to withdraw all special and exclusive rights for
other telecommunication services. Resale of leased line capacity for data services is
permitted as of January 1, 1993 or January 1, 1996, depending on the Member State. 2
The European Commission is developing a Community market of high quality
telecommunication equipment and services, and it therefore encourages the national
telecommunications administrations to invest in the networks.
247. Here, 'foreign" terminal equipment refers to equipment which is not supplied by the
telecommunications administration or local operating company.
248. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 135.
251. Telecom to cut prices as communications duopoly ends, THE TIMEs, Mar. 6, 1991, at 1.
252. See supra notes 171-210 and accompanying text (discussing intra-Community trade in
telecommunication services).
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Since the 1984 divestiture of AT&T and the MFJ, 3 a strict distinction between local
and long-distance service is necessary in the U.S. These services have to be provided by
different companies to prevent the reassembly of a new vertical monopoly. Numerous local
operating companies exist, 4 many of which formed part of the pre-1984 Bell System. In
order to avoid abuse of their bottleneck position, the operating companies must provide open
network architecture and access to their customers for the long-distance carriers.
Furthermore, they cannot engage in competitive telecommunications activities. 5 The
long-distance carriers, on the other hand, cannot engage in local service. Every customer can
choose which long-distance company they want to use, and some even have a choice of local
service providers. 6
Although the international market is among the more rapidly growing markets for U.S.
interexchange carriers, it still produces only five percent of their revenues. Because other
companies have found it difficult to obtain connections to foreign PTTs, AT&T still
dominates the international market. Nonetheless, MCI and US Sprint have increased their
international operations rapidly since 1987Y
7
4. Subsidization
The main objective of European PTTs has been general telephone coverage: placing the
telephone within reach of every consumer. Apart from the monopoly regime, it has resulted
in heavily subsidizing rentals and connections through usage related call charges, and
subsidizing local rates with long-distance tariffs.
An intricate system of cross-subsidization has been set up in the U.S. by the FCC.
Strictly speaking, it can be argued that for the cost-shifting from local to long-distance to
represent a subsidy, the price of interstate service would have to be above the stand-alone
costs of providing this service, including the costs of providing local connections for
interexchange calls alone. However, what happens in the U.S. is exactly what happens in
Europe. When voice telephony is liberalized in the EC, regulators can anticipate problems
similar to those which the FCC has faced in the U.S.; deciding on the models and the means
of measuring costs and distributing them evenly over local and long-distance service
providers.
5. Regulation
The European FITs are regulated by the national laws of the Member States. Tariff
changes and the organization of the telecommunication services sector are subject to
government approval. Equipment has to fulfill certain essential EC requirements, but when
it is approved in one Member State, the "CE" sign can be affixed and the equipment is
assumed to fulfill essential requirements in all Member States. Other Member States cannot
253. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
254. See CRANDALL, supra note 212, at 25.
255. See supra notes 211-42 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. telecommunication sector).
256. I
257. CRANDAIL, supra note 212, at 50-51.
258. See supra notes 143-70 and accompanying text (providing details on testing in non-Community
countries).
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demand re-testing. The European Commission monitors telecommunications tariffs and can
undertake action if it decides that prices are too high or that tariffs otherwise conflict with
Community competition rules." 9 All U.S. common carrier services are under state and
federal (FCC) regulation, while the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
administers the 1982 MFJ.2 ° Although there are competitive suppliers of virtually every
service and equipment, two major problems plague the combination of regulation and liberal
market entry policies. First, regulators are likely to be forced into the role of cartel
managers, particularly if one or more carriers find themselves unable to compete. New
entrants or even incumbents may use the regulatory process to prevent their rivals from
cutting rates by claiming that such rates are predatory. Second, regulators may tighten
barriers to entry in other markets to preserve some politically motivated cross subsidy. 6'
It has been demonstrated above that these subsidies mainly serve less traffic dense routes,
both in the U.S. and in Europe. Regulators find themselves beholden to the pressure of
incumbent carriers, especially when they require these carriers to offer various
nonremunerative services.
262
6. Future Regulation in the EC
Competition, not regulated monopoly, is likely to be the best market structure to
encourage technical progress. However, the rise in local rates in the U.S. during the early
1980s affected the willingness of low-income households to subscribe to telephone service.
Moreover, the reduction of cross-subsidization will lead to higher telephone bills for lower
income households, while higher-income households, which typically consume more long-
distance service and more other services that.are telephone intensive, such as travel and
financial services, will see their telephone bills decrease.263 This is contrary to current
Community aims of general telephone coverage, especially in the less favored peripheral
regions of the Community. When the Community common telecommunications market is
realized, and basic telecommunication services are exposed to competition, the Community
will face many of the regulatory problems the FCC has coped with over the past twenty-five
years.
B. Concluding Assessment
The aim of this Article was to determine whether the fear and accusation of Fortress
Europe was realistic in the telecommunications sector. This in turn raised two central
questions: first, can and will access to the EC telecommunication equipment and services
markets be restricted for U.S. telecommunication equipment and services as a result of the
259. EEC TREATY, supra note 5, art. 86.
260. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
261. CRANDALL, supra note 212, at 155.
262. Id. at 163; see infra Appendix 1(8).
263. CRANDAU, supra note 212 (finding $15 to $16 increases per year for low-income households versus
$15 decreases for higher-income households).
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1992 Program; and, second, can and will non-Community U.S. telecommunication
equipment and service providers be discriminated against within the Community as a result
of the 1992 Program?
The 1992 Program should not be confused with protectionism which has occurred prior
to 1992.2' Nonetheless, many of the U.S. concerns mentioned previously, such as the
elimination of import duties and government procurement, involve protectionism which
existed prior to the 1992 Program. Some concerns are legitimate and must be taken
seriously. All concerns are currently the subject of bilateral or multilateral negotiations.
Other concerns may also be justified, but so can the EC positions, for example, on the
standardization process and the temporary exclusion of voice telephony from competition.
Still other concerns involve situations which have no connection with the 1992 Program and
should therefore not be included in discussions on the reality of the Fortress Europe
allegations.
Fortress Europe is an external dimension of internal EC measures. The European
Commission's 1985 White Paper on the Internal Market led to the 1987 Green Paper on
telecommunications, which has two goals. The first is to develop a strong
telecommunications infrastructure and efficient telecommunication services. This goal has
already led to enormous investments. Although partially privately funded, most of the
investments were made by the national telecommunications administrations. Those
administrations will fiud the majority of future investments as well. The second goal is to
increase competition in the telecommunications sector, as long as this does not harm the first
goal. This second goal has already led to the liberalization of the sale of telecommunication
equipment, as well as to the liberalization of value-added services. After January 1, 1993
or January 1,1996, it will lead to competition in the packet or circuit switched data services
sector as well.
The Commission presently considers liberalization of voice telephony to conflict with
the first goal because it would seriously threaten the financial stability of the
telecommunications providers. This is a legitimate concern. The Commission's second
concern, that voice telephony is the most important means of accessing emergency services
charged with public safety, should not be overlooked, either. Accessing those services
mainly depends on the local network, and the separation which exists between local and
long-distance service in the U.S. does not exist in Europe. It is therefore not possible to
protect only the local service providers in the EC, as it is in the U.S. Unless the EC
telecommunications administrations were to be split up, liberalization of the voice telephony
market would result in c6 mplete liberalization of this sector in the Community.
The exclusion of voice telephony from competition may be justified not only in a
Community context, but also in a larger, international framework. A model treaty on the
international trade in services includes an article on service monopolies. It states that
"domestic measures, which constitute a government owned monopoly or a government
sanctioned private monopoly, are regarded as inappropriate, unless the Party demonstrates
264. Pelkmans, supra note 15, at 127.
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the necessity of such measures...." 265 Although the final GATT text will undoubtedly
be quite different from the model, it may well contain a similar provision. If it does, the
EC's restriction on voice telephony could be justified on non-economic grounds: the
development of the telecommunications networks and services, as well as public safety.
The Commission has made it clear that in the pursuit of competition in the
telecommunications sector, liberalization and harmonization must go hand in hand. 2 "
Harmonization and standardization will yield large profits for equipment manufacturers and
service providers alike. This aspect of the future Internal Market is often underestimated.
This Article challenges U.S. accusations regarding the EC standard-setting process and
explains the advantages of the harmonization process. It argues that the fact that the EC
already determines its own standards, in the absence of international ones, is a sign of failing
international willpower to come to international standards, and that it should not prevent the
EC from integrating the national markets of the Member States. The only justified concern
seems to be that tests have to be performed by notified bodies in the Member States, or in
other countries, under supervision of Community-notified bodies. This is not protectionistic
because recognition has not been regulated before. It is logical that a standard-setting
country would want the opportunity to supervise the testing. However, negotiations on
recognizing tests performed by third country testing laboratories are currently underway
between the U.S. Trade Representative and the European Commission.
The goal of increased competition has resulted in the government procurement
directive, 267 which still contains a non-mandatory 50 percent content rule for
telecommunication equipment.2 6 As soon as the multilateral reciprocity negotiations
regarding the GATT Government Procurement Code result in expansion of that Code to
include the excluded sectors, U.S. equipment can no longer be discriminated against at the
national and Community level. Conclusion of a bilateral U.S.-EC agreement may even lead
to full application of the procurement directive to products originating in the U.S. This means
that bodies at all levels of government will be obliged to consider offers containing U.S.
equipment on the same footing as offers containing Community equipment. These bilateral
negotiations take place in the context of government procurement in general, which exceeds
the scope of this Article.
Neither explicit nor implicit, VERs' quantitative restrictions apply to the importation of
telecommunication equipment in the Community. Although import duties exist, they are not
a result of the 1992 Program and should not be included in discussions on the reality of
Fortress Europe. Telecommunication equipment originating in the U.S. already receives
national treatment in the individual Member States and formal Community treatment in
intra-Community trade. As a result of the liberalization actions following the Green Paper
and the ensuing regulations, trade in telecommunication equipment will increase, which will
result in material Community treatment as well. The government procurement directive will
cause U.S. telecommunication equipment to be considered on the state, provincial, and local
levels.
265. COLLENTEuR, supra note 80, at 59.
266. Commission Guidelines on the Application of EEC Competition Rules in the Telecommunications
Sector, 6.9.1991 OJ. (C 233) 2, pref., third para.
267. Directive 90/5311EEC, supra note 106.
268. Its services counterpart does not contain such a clause. See supra notes 171-210 and accompanying
text.
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The U.S. fear that p6litical non-Community U.S. companies will be discriminated
against is unjustified. It has been clearly established that the political aspect of a company
is not important, as long as the requirements of article 58 of the EEC Treaty and the
requirements of the General Programmes269 are fulfilled. These favored companies can
provide the liberalized telecommunication services and establish agencies, branches, and
subsidiaries in second Member States.270 Establishment in the first Member State can be
based on the bilateral Treaties of Friendship, the multilateral OECD Code on Liberalization
of Capital Movements, and perhaps shortly on a GATT Agreement on Trade in Services.
The U.S. concern that the volume of transatlantic telecommunication services will not
increase may be justified until a multilateral agreement is concluded in the GATT Uruguay
Round. However, increased U.S. investments in the EC can be expected even if no
agreement can be reached. Whether that can be called forced investment remains to be seen.
As costs for international telecommunications connections become more dependant on
volume, it is likely that more services will be performed locally, regardless of
telecommunications access provisions.
271
Import quotas, reciprocity requirements, local content standards, minimum direct
investment standards, market segment insulation policies, and domestic company definitions,
it is feared, will result in preferential treatment for EC firms. However, this Article
establishes several important facts. First, neither import quotas nor VERs exist for
telecommunication equipment. Second, reciprocity is a principle of international law upon
which the GATT system is based, and as such, reciprocity requirements might return in the
GATT Uruguay Round negotiations with regard to access for telecommunication services
and in the negotiations on government procurement. Reciprocity is not typically a
protectionist device but rather a bargaining tool to obtain similar rights for one's own
companies as are accorded to companies of other countries. Third, application of current
local content standards concern only telecommunication equipment and is not mandatory.
The standards are being negotiated bilaterally and multilaterally. Fourth, market segment
insulation policies are prohibited by articles 85, 86, and 90 of the EEC Treaty and are the
opposite of the goal otfthe 1992 Program. Finally, domestic company definitions are strictly
geographic, do not contain political elements, and allow U.S. companies to provide intra-
Community telecommunication services and the right to set up agencies, branches, and
subsidiaries, like any other Community company. EC firms cannot receive preferential
treatment, nor can U.S. firms be disfavored.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Community is working hard to liberalize as many telecommunication services as
possible without losing sight of the goal of development of the sector. If EC policy towards
the telecommunication services sector is perceived as protectionist by the U.S., it is because
269. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
270. Only after the Member States have made an arrangement for the problems of company law involved
in the framework of article 220 of the EEC Treaty can companies entail a right to transfer their registered office.
Case 81/87, The Queen v. H.M Treasury and Commissioners of inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and
General Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, 5512 Considerations 21-25.
271. There will always be a larger volume of services within the Community than between the Community
and the U.S., as is true in the U.S. Therefore, costs will always be lower within the EC.
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of the differences in organization of the EC and U.S. telecommunication services sectors.
In terms of competition, the EC telecommunication services sector is currently in the
position that the U.S. occupied thirty years ago. The U.S. experience teaches that
liberalization of the telecommunication services sector does not happen overnight and
deserves the full attention of the regulating authorities. No measures have been found which
are aimed against non-Member States, with the exception of article 29 of the government
procurement directive. 2 However, telecommunications is a special sector, as is clear
from the fact that it is specifically excluded from the GATT Government Procurement Code.
This issue will ideally be resolved in the current bilateral and multilateral negotiations.
Therefore, the central questions of this Article can be answered as follows. First, access
to the EC telecommunication equipment and services markets cannot be restricted as a result
of the 1992 Program. However, internal EC measures will increase EC and world trade.
Second, telecommunication equipment originating in the U.S. receives national and
Community treatment and is not discriminated against in intra-Community trade. Third,
political U.S. telecommunication service providers cannot be discriminated against in the EC
as a result of the 1992 Program because they are Community service providers. Therefore,
the accusations of a Fortress Europe are not well founded.
272. Directive 90/531/EEC, supra note 106.
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APPENDIX I
ACIONS TAKEN TO DATE RELATING TO
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
(1) The Commission enacted a directive2 73 to open up the market for
telecommunications terminal equipment to competition, based on article 90(3) of
the EEC Treaty. The legal basis of the directive was challenged in the
Telecommunications case,274 but the Commission won most of the battle.
(2) The Commission issued a directive2 7 5 to open up the market for
telecommunications services to competition, again based on article 90(3) of the
EEC Treaty. This directive, too, is being challenged,276 but not only on legal
grounds. Several Member States do not agree with the extent of the liberalization
plans of the Commission.
6
(3) The Council issued Directive 90/53 1/EEC 77 on the procurement procedures of
entities operating in the water, energy, transport, and telecommunications
sectors. 8
(a) The Council issued Directive 92/13/EEC 279 coordinating the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of
Community rules on the procurement of procedures of entities operating in the
water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors.
(b) The Cotncil issued Directive 92/50/EEC2 ° relating to the coordination of
procedures for the award of public service contracts
273. Commission Dfirective 881301/EEC, on Competition in the Markets in Telecommunications Terminal
Equipment, 27.5.1988 O.J. (L 131) 73.
274. Case C-202/88, France v. Commission, Judgment of 19 March 1991, 5 C.M.L.R. 552 (1992).
275. Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for
telecommunications services, 24.7.1990 OJ. (L 192) 10.
276. By Belgium (action brought Sept. 14, 1990) and Italy (action brought Sep. 20, 1990), cases C-281/90
and C-289/90 respectively 31.10.1990 OJ. (C 274) 20.
277. 29.10.1990 OJ. (L 297) 1.
278. The "excluded sectors" are given this name because they are excluded from the application of the
.normal" public procurement directives 77/62, relative to the award of public supply contracts, and 71/305,
relative to the award of public works contracts.
279. 30.9.1992 OJ. (L 225).
280. Council Directive of 18.5.1992, 24.7.1992 O.J (L 209).
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(4) The Council issued a directive"' covering the harmonization of legal and
administrative provisions in the Member States for Open Network Provision
(ONP). Its aim is to guarantee open and efficient access to and use of the public
network and public telecommunications services.
(a) The Council issued Directive 92/44/EEC2 2 on the application of open
network provisions to leased lines.
(b) The Council issued Recommendation 92/382/EEC2 3 on the harmonization
provision of a minimum set of packet-switched data services (PSDS) in
accordance with Open Network Provision (ONP) principles.
(c) The Council issued Recommendation 92/383/EEC 284 on the provision of
harmonized intergrated services digital network (ISDN) access arrangements
and a minimum set of ISDN offerings inaccordance with OPN principles.
(5) On December 22, 1986, the Council issued Recommendation 86/659/EEC2"5 on
the coordinated introduction of the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) in
the Community, as well as Decision 87/95/EEC 6 on standardization in the field
of information technology and telecommunications.
(6) The Council issued a directive28 7 on the approximation of the laws of the Member
States concerning telecommunications terminal equipment, including the mutual
recognition of their conformity.
(7) The Commission issued guidelines on the application of competition rules in the
telecommunications sector,28 8 aimed at clarifying the application of these rules
by the Commission. The guidelines essentially concern the application of articles
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty.
281. Council Directive 90/387/EEC of June 28, 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for
telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision, 24.7.1990 OJ. (L 192) 1.
282. 19.6.1992 OJ. (L 165).
283. Council Recommendation of June 5, 1992, 18.7.1992 OJ. (L 200).
284. Council Recommendation of June 5, 1992, 18.7.1992 OJ. (L 200).
285. 31.12.1986 OJ. (L 382) 36.
286. Council Decision 87/95/EEC, 7.2.1987 OJ. (L 36) 31.
287. Council Directive 91/263/EEC of April 29, 1991, 23.5.1991 OJ. (L 128) 1.
288. Commission guidelines on the application of EEC competition rules in the telecommunications sector,
6.9.1991 OJ. (C 233) 2.
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(8) The Council issued a recommendation 9 and a directive 290 pertaining to the
introduction of a pan-European digital mobile cellular communications system
(GSM-system) in the Community, and the Commission intends to publish a green
paper on the future development of mobile communications. 2 " According to the
Council, access to cellular digital mobile communications should be
unrestricted.2 '
(9) The Commission proposed293 a Council recommendation on the coordinated
introduction of digital European cordless telecommunications (DECT) in the
Community.
(10) The Commission published a Green Paper on Satellite communications, 294 the
contents of which have been welcomed by the EC Committee of the American
Chamber of Commerce in Belgium. 295 This new green paper expands the
principles already developed in the Green Paper on telecommunications, taking into
account the specificity of satellite communications.
(11) The Council, in its resolution of 30 June 1988296, made it clear that
telecommunications administrations will have to move towards a greater cost
orientation for tariffs.297 The Commission should have conducted a review of
progress achieved on this objective by January 1, 1992, and it will monitor tariffs
closely.
(12) The proposal of the Green Paper for the creation of a European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) resulted in a major reform of the
standards setting process in the sector. ETSI was founded in April 1988 in Sophia-
Antipolis near Nice, France.
289. Council Recommendation 87/371/EEC of June 25, 1987, 17.7.1987 OJ. (L 196) 81.
290. Council Directive 87/372/EEC of June 25, 1987, 17.7.1987 O.J. (L 196) 85.
291. Council Resolution of December 14,1990, on the Final Stage of the Coordinated Introduction of Pan-
European Land-Based Public Digital Mobile Cellular Communications in the Community (GSM), 31.12.1990
OJ. (C 329) 25, at 26.
292. Council Recommendation 87/371/EEC, supra note 282, 5th Recommendation.
293. 27.7.1990 OJ. (C 187) 1; COM(90)139 final, 12.6.1990.
294. COM(90)490, 28.11.1990.
295. EURoPE No. 5519, Jun. 24-25, 1991, at 17.
296. Council Resolution of June 30, 1988 on the Development of the Common Market for
Telecommunications Services and Equipment up to 1992, 4.10.1988 OJ. (C 257) 1.
297. According to Information Market, costs may vary between Member States by 426 percent or more
for identical calls. Neither distance nor GNP per head of population seem to play a role in international traffic.
INFORMATION MARKET, Feb.-Apr. 1991, at 7.
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APPENDIX II
SELECTED LIST OF MERGERS AND JOINT VENTURES
WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE
EC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
BETWEEN 1984 AND 1987298
A. Telecommunication Equipment
1. Alcatel, the French equipment group, acquired the European activities of TT;
2. The Swedish producers Ericsson won the take over of the French equipment group
CGCT, together with MATRA;
3. In Italy, thetelecommunication manufacturers Italtel andTelettra attemptedto form
Telit; they collaborated with GTE, now Siemens, in ITALCOM;
4. An agreement was concluded between GEC and Plessey to merge their telecom
business in a 50/50 joint venture;
5. ITT sold its stake in STC to Northern Telecom of Canada;
6. CGE, Siemens, Italtel, and Plessey have cooperative links;
7. Philips has a joint venture with AT&T for transmission;
8. Siemens has a 50/50 joint venture with the American GTE regarding switching,
transmission, R&D, and manufacturing, which affects STE's European markets;
9. British Telecom acquired a majority interest in the Canadian PABX manufacturer
Mitel;
10. Plessey acquired Stromberg-Carlson of the U.S.; and
11. NTT, NEC, Fijitsu, Hitachi, and Old collaborate on a project.
B. Computers
1. IBMbought Rolm, a leading U.S. manufacturer of office communications systems;
2. In the U.K., STC purchased the computer maker ICL;
298. J. Miller, RESEARCH ON THE "COST OF NON-EUROPE'-BASIC FINDINGS, Vol. 10, Annex 1, App. 2,
at A.15.
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3. Ericsson formed links with Honeywell; and
4. ATT and Olivetti link up.
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APPENDIX III
TELEPHONE PENETRATION IN THE EC, PER MEMBER STATE, AND IN THE U.S.
Country Rank Telephone Telephone
connections connections per 100
(x 1,000) inhabitants
Belgium 71 3,257 33.0
Denmark 1 2,683 52.4
France 4 23,911 42.2
Fed. Rep. Germany 3 26,399 43.2
Greece 71 3,292 33.0
Ireland 10 751 21.2
Italy 8 18,253 31.9
Luxembourg 2 162 45.3
Netherlands 5 6,029 41.3
Portugal 11 1,512 14.8
Spain 9 9,801 25.2
United Kingdom 6 21,654 38.3
European Community 117,704 35.8
United States 112,202 50.82
Sources: INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION, YEARBOOK OF COMMON
CARRIER STATISTICS (1988) and CEC studies, cited in UNGERER, supra note 9, at 30;
U.S. Telecommunications Association; U.S. Census Bureau. The reference year is
1986.
' Shared rank. 2 Estimate.

